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ABSTRACT 
 This research examines the often-glorified relationship between New France and 
the American Indians with which that empire came into contact in North America, 
focusing primarily on the conflicting policies seen during the Fox Wars and the Natchez 
Wars. Many recent histories of New France, including Richard White‟s seminal study 
The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics, 1650-1815, focus primarily on the 
lands surrounding the Great Lakes. These histories champion a French Indian policy that 
was dominated by the fur trade and illustrated by the outbreak of the Fox Wars in 1712. 
However, New France‟s Indian policy was not always dictated by the vast and powerful 
fur trade. Once the French reached the Gulf of Mexico and began settling in the Deep 
South, priorities changed, and an often-overlooked chapter of colonial French history 
began.  
 Much of the primary research on the Natchez Indians was performed by looking 
exhaustively though the letters, decrees and memoirs written in The Mississippi 
Provincial Archives: French Dominion Volumes II, III and IV. Antoine-Simon Le Page 
du Pratz‟s L’Histoire de la Louisiane also proved to be an invaluable primary resource 
during the process. When dealing with the Upper Country, much of my research focused 
on the primary source smorgasbord presented online by the Wisconsin Historical 
Collections and the Michigan Pioneers and Historical Collections.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In Sid Meier‟s 1994 computer game Colonization, France‟s early ventures in the 
New World are described as so:  
Though French forts, missions and trading posts soon dotted the Great Lakes 
region, French settlements were generally small enough to operate in relative 
harmony with the local native population. Although this relationship was not 
entirely without incident, the French were often able to cooperate profitably with 
the natives. This cooperation occasionally extended into the military realm. To 
reflect the superior ability of the French to cooperate with the native population, 
the French player‟s colonies and units cause alarm among the Indians at only half 
the rate of other European powers.”
1
  
While Meier‟s computer game is not a scholarly work, nor the authority on France in the 
New World, it is indicative of France‟s pigeonholed role in the New World of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that of perennial ally to the Indians.   
For those who do not study history for a living or a hobby, it is easier, and more 
convenient, to understand colonial North America when each European colonizer is 
wrapped up in a neatly-packaged role. For instance, the English arrived in the New World 
to build settlements, while the Spanish arrived to plunder and seek gold. The common 
perception of the French is that they were there to trade, a far less imposing activity than 
settlement-building and gold-seeking and one that put them in the good graces of the 
Indians.  
This perception is strengthened by the French and Indian War, a poorly-titled 
conflict that is widely studied in schools. Per my own experience in an American public 
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 Sid Meier, Colonlization (DOS version), MicroProse (MicroProse, 1994). 
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school system, it is “hip” to understand that the French and Indian War was not actually a 
war in which the French fought the Indians, but a war in which the French and Indians 
fought the English. It is less “hip” to further connect the dots and understand that the 
French and Indian War was actually a war in which the French and Indians fought the 
English and other Indians. This common misunderstanding furthers the over-simplified 
notion that Indians befriended the French and fought everyone else. It also helps build in 
the mind the romanticized image of the Coureur des bois, rugged, bearded French 
woodsmen, clad in buckskins, who glided down rivers on canoes with their Indian allies, 
hunting and trapping and providing the perfect foil to stuffy, tricorne-wearing, Bible-
thumping English Puritans and dastardly, morion-wearing, pike-wielding Spanish 
Conquistadors. 
Meier‟s computer game is not alone, however, in painting a halcyon portrait of 
French and Indian relations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Historians – 
both of the era and contemporary – succumbed to the same fallacy. “Traditional opinion 
concerning French and Indian relations in colonial North America holds that the natives 
received better treatment from the French than from the other Europeans who explored 
and settled the continent,” Patricia Dillon Woods admitted in French-Indian Relations on 
the Southern Frontier, 1699-1762.
2
 Pierre Francois Xavier de Charlevoix, a Jesuit often 
referred to as the first historian of New France, and Francis Parkman, a distinguished 
nineteenth-century historian, greatly contributed to that “traditional opinion.” Charlevoix 
once compared English and French colonists in such a way: “The English Americans … 
in no way show consideration for the Indians, for they do not believe they have any 
                                                          
2
 Patricia Dillon Woods, French-Indian Relations on the Southern Frontier 1699-1762 (Ann Arbor: UMI 
Research Press, 1980), 108. 
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requirement for them. For contrary reasons, the Canadian youth detest peace, and live 
with the aborigines of the country, from whom they easily gain esteem in war and 
friendship at all times.”
3
 In his book, Pioneers of France in the New World, Parkman 
similarly presented a dramatic depiction of colonial Frenchmen as unbridled, symbiotic 
outdoorsmen, whose cooperative nature, more so than English expansionism and Spanish 
fanaticism, appealed to Indians. “New England was preeminently the land of material 
progress,” and New Spain represented “a tyranny of monks and inquisitors,” Parkman 
broadly observed. However, New France was populated by “a people compassed by the 
influences of the wildest freedom – whose schools were the forest and the sea, whose 
trade was an armed barter with savages.” New France, Parkman eloquently lamented, “is 
a memory of the past. And, when we evoke its departed shades, they rise upon us from 
their graves in a strange romantic guise. Again their ghostly camp-fires seem to burn, and 
the fitful light is cast around on lord and vassal and black-robed priest, mingled with wild 
forms of savage warriors, knit in close fellowship on the same stern errand.”
4
 Neither 
Charlevoix or Parkman explicitly stated that French and Indian relations in North 
America were unblemished; however, both used flowery language to form in the mind 
the image of organic, unbigoted French pioneers who befriended Indians and, essentially, 
became like Indians. 
This image has displayed a remarkable lifespan. Several twentieth-century 
accounts of the colonization of North America bought into it wholeheartedly. In his book, 
The French and Indian War, Donald Barr Chidsey wrote that English settlers “took no 
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 Francois Xavier de Charlevoix, as quoted in F.E. Whitton’s Wolfe and North America (London: Ernest 
Benn Limited, 1929), 133. 
4
 Francis Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1876): ix-x. 
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interest in the moral well-being of the redskin,” while French settlers “were fascinated by 
the Indians.” According to Chidsey, the French “learned the languages, they respected the 
customs and adopted the habits … the French plunged into the wilderness fearlessly, 
making astonishing trips of exploration. The English obliterated the wilderness, laying it 
low as they pushed westward, leaving behind them only stumps.”
5
 In Wolfe and North 
America, another book dealing primarily with the French and Indian War, F.E. Whitton 
agreed with Chidsey concerning an innate French attraction to Indians, and vice versa. 
“The native population shrank before the English as from an advancing pestilence,” 
Whitton wrote, “On the other hand, in the very heart of Canada, Indian communities 
sprang up, cherished by the Government and favoured by the easy-tempered people.”
6
  
Realistically, however, French relations with Indians were far more nuanced and 
far less romantic. The very nature of France‟s early mission in the New World – the 
lucrative fur trade – made it so that the French did not impose on Indians with the same 
ferocity as the colonizing English and conquering Spanish. In fact, the fur trade required 
the French to actively seek peace with and assistance from the Indians with which they 
came into contact. In the eighteenth century, however, France, ever-expanding in its 
ambition and clout on the continent, engaged in two wars – at essentially the same time, 
but hundreds of miles from one another – that resulted in the near-annihilation of one 
Indian tribe and the absolute annihilation of another. The differences between these 
conflicts – the Fox Wars (1712-1716, 1728-1732) and the Natchez Wars (1715, 1722, 
1723, 1729) – underlined a major shift in France‟s mission in the New World. By the 
1720s, the French had morphed from a late-to-the-party, inconspicuous bystander, 
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 Donald Barr Chidsey, The French and Indian War (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1969), 15-18. 
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 Whitton, 136, 139. 
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content to trade furs with Indians, to the land-hungry, imperialist model made popular by 
the English and Spanish. 
The historiography of the Fox Wars is vast, and the wars play an especially 
important role in historian Richard White‟s expansive, respected treatise on French and 
Indian interactions in the Great Lakes region, The Middle Ground. In The Middle 
Ground, White delivers a thoughtful and well-researched portrayal of the French colonial 
enterprise, and he does so in a manner far more nuanced and sophisticated than any of the 
historians discussed in the previous two paragraphs; however, his scope is limited. White 
paints a portrait of the Fox Wars as an event that shaped all future interactions between 
the French and their Indian allies, and he paints a portrait of the fur trade as an enterprise 
that guided all Indian policy in New France. He does not take into account the completely 
alternate Indian policy that occurred further south down the Mississippi River, a policy 
that had little to do with the Fox Wars or the fur trade. The historiography of the Natchez 
Wars is more limited, perhaps because the Natchez Wars, more so than the Fox Wars, fail 
to advance France‟s accepted New World personality. Yet, it was the Natchez Wars that 
more aptly illustrated the direction in which French colonialism was headed and revealed 
the duality of France‟s situational Indian policies in North America. The Fox Wars are 
more easily digested because they revolved around the fur trade and, thus, espoused a 
French Indian policy centered on non-intervention and the desire for peace.   However, 
French Indian policy was not always based on the fur trade, especially once French boats 
reached Louisiana and discovered the Natchez bluffs. 
The Natchez was a tribe located on bluffs overlooking the eastern shores of the 
lower Mississippi river in then-Louisiana and present-day Mississippi. Woods noted that 
6 
 
of the three most powerful tribes in the lower Mississippi River basin at the dawn of the 
eighteenth century, the Choctaw, the Chickasaws and the Natchez, the Natchez were the 
most enigmatic. Upon their arrival in the region, the French immediately acquired the 
Choctaw as allies and the Chickasaws (who were already trading partners with the 
English) as enemies, yet “Louisiana‟s leaders remained uncertain about their status with 
the Natchez people.”
7
  
The English, France‟s primary North American competitor by the early 1700s, 
remained uncertain about their status with the Natchez people, too. In fact, the Natchez, 
who Woods describes as patently “different from the other natives of Louisiana,” were 
never fully allied with any colonial power.
8
 Early eighteenth century French policy in the 
New World was to seek peace with Indian tribes not already linked to a European rival. 
In a letter to Sieur de Muy, the fourth governor of Louisiana, King Louis XIV explained 
this policy, saying peace with Indians was necessary “in order to get control of their 
commerce and to prevent the English from coming to trade among them.”
9
 Yet, over the 
nearly 30-year period in which they were in contact, the French and the Natchez never 
truly found peace. Uneasy truces were spoiled by misunderstandings and insults, leading 
to three small wars and, eventually, the annihilation of the Natchez by the French in 
1732.   
France‟s expulsion of the Natchez from existence was an aberration, and, thus, it 
is not easily understood through the lens of traditional French policy. It is more easily 
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 Woods, 23. 
8
 Woods, 23. 
9
 King Louis XIV to De Muy, 30 June 1707, in Mississippi Provincial Archives 1704-1743 French Dominion 
Vol. III, ed. Dunbar Rowland and Albert Godfrey Sanders (Jackson: Press of the Mississippi Department of 
Archives and  History, 1932), 51. It should be noted that this letter never reached De Muy, as he died in 
Havana on his voyage to Louisiana. 
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understood through the lens of failing French-Canadian policy attempting to be applied in 
French-Louisiana. In Canada and the Great Lakes region, far to the north of the dismal 
swamps and thick fog of the Mississippi River Delta in an area dubbed “the middle 
ground” by White, trade – primarily the fur trade – was the prevalent religion, and the 
French and English attempted to fortify their dominance by creating intricate commercial 
alliances with and among the various Indian tribes in the region. In the Upper Country, a 
policy of peace made sense, because harmony facilitated the fur trade. However, when 
French boats expanded downriver into Louisiana around the turn of the century, they 
found a country of cash crops, not fur trade, and the growth of cash crops requires 
something the fur trade does not: land. When the Louisiana colony, then located on the 
low mouth of the river, struggled through disease and crop-killing fog in its early years, 
French eyes turned towards the lush bluffs of the Natchez, located high above the river 
and referred to in an early report of the country by De Sauvole de La Villantray, 
Louisiana‟s second governor, as “very different, for it is perfectly good and agreeable.”
10
 
By 1732, the Natchez were no more and that perfectly good and agreeable land belonged 
to the French. 
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 Sauvole to Pontchartrain?, 4 August 1701, in Mississippi Provincial Archives 1701-1729 French Dominion 
Vol. II, ed. Dunbar Rowland and Albert Godfrey Sanders (Jackson: Press of the Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History, 1929), 16. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FOX WARS 
The French were relative latecomers to North America, at least in terms of 
establishing a substantial population on the continent. The ill-fated quest for a western 
route to Asia in the mid-sixteenth century led French explorers to present-day Canada, 
where over the course of a century they established New France, a vast fur-trading 
empire consisting of sparsely-populated mercantile settlements scattered around the Great 
Lakes that were dependent upon amicable relations with local Indians. The French 
submitted a token effort into developing their settlements as more than just remote pelt-
trading outposts, resulting in the founding of Quebec City by Samuel de Champlain in 
1608 and its coronation as the capital of New France in 1663. Still, the population of 
Quebec City, New France‟s largest settlement, hovered around 2,000 people as late as 
1690.
11
 The fur trade, not colonization, remained France‟s foremost and most profitable 
operation in North America, and that is why letters came all the way from Versailles 
stressing a policy of peace with Indians who were willing to have it.
12
 Peace begat 
stability in the region, and stability in the region begat profitable trade. 
When the French moved south and west from Canada into the Great Lakes region, 
however, they did not enter a peaceful world. It was a splintered world; a world full of 
refugees fleeing the powerful, English-aligned Iroquois from the east. For decades, the 
imperialistic Iroquois Confederacy had been encroaching westward, fragmenting every 
tribe in its path. “Never again in North America would Indians fight each other on this 
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 Gwenael Cartier, “City of Quebec 1608-2008: 400 Years of Censuses,” Canadian Social Trends 11 (2008): 
64. 
12
 King Louis XIV to De Muy, 30 June 1707, Vol. III, 51. 
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scale or with this ferocity,” White wrote of the bloodshed that stained the Upper Country 
in the mid-seventeenth century.
13
 The French quickly allied themselves with a host of 
Algonquian tribes pushed to lands along the western Great Lakes by the horrors of the 
Iroquois warfare. Sandwiched in present-day Michigan, Illinois and Wisconsin by two 
enemies, the Iroquois to the east and the enigmatic and unencumbered Sioux to the west, 
these refugee tribes – primarily the Ottawa, Chippewa and Huron – looked to the French 
for protection, and the French usually provided it because the tribes were profitable trade 
partners, and, if united, they formed a formidable buffer between French operations in the 
west and Iroquois and English encroaches from the east. Then, in 1701, Louis-Hector de 
Callieres, the governor of New France, negotiated a peace treaty in Montreal, known as 
the Grand Settlement, between France‟s western Great Lakes allies and the Iroquois. The 
French anticipated that the equilibrium brought about by the monumental truce would 
effectively end a half-century of Indian warfare and that “both the fur trade and New 
France would prosper.”
14
 
They were right; peace took hold of the Upper Country and the fur trade 
prospered in the years that immediately followed. Phillipe de Rigaud Vaudreuil, who 
became governor of New France two years after the Grand Settlement was signed, 
facilitated the peace by championing an “anti-imperialistic” policy in the Great Lakes 
region.
15
 He espoused a hands-off approach to dealing with local Indians, promoting 
goodwill among travelers, free trade and open waterways, which, of course, resulted in 
                                                          
13
 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region,1650-1815 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 1. 
14
 R. David Edmunds and Joseph L. Peyser, The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993): 3. 
15
 Louise Phelps Kellogg, Ph.D., “The Fox Indians During the French Regime,” Wisconsin Historical Society: 
156.  
10 
 
healthy quantities of peltry arriving at markets in Quebec City and Montreal. His motives 
might have been profit, but Vaudreuil‟s policy of stepping back and leaving the Indians 
to their own devices succeeded in creating a sense of Pax New France at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century. In her article “The Fox Indians During the French Regime,” 
Louise Phelps Kellogg wrote of this tranquil time: “The Upper Country was pacified, all 
sat quiet upon their mats, and smoked the calumet.”
16
 
It was a fragile peace, however, and a peace that was mended several times by the 
desperate mediation of Vaudreuil. The Iroquois‟ failed promise to return prisoners from 
previous wars created much antagonism, and the Iroquois and Algonquins “murdered 
each other at an alarming frequency” while hunting beaver pelts in the same territory. 
White contended that open war would have erupted if not for the “repeated personal 
intervention” of Vaudreuil, who “covered the dead hunters and obtained compensation 
for Algonquin attacks.”
17
 
Then there were the Fox. The Fox Indians – along with other tribes, including the 
Sauk and Kickapoo – represented a different group occupying the Great Lakes region at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. They represented the Indians that had always 
been there, or at least had been there longer than the refugee tribes that poured into the 
region in the seventeenth century. The Fox, also known as the Mesquakie, originated 
around the St. Lawrence River Valley, migrated west to the lower peninsula of present-
day Michigan and were then pushed even further west to the eastern shores of present-
day Wisconsin in the mid-seventeenth by the encroaching Chippewa, who were fleeing 
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 Kellogg, 156. 
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 White, 151. 
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the encroaching Iroquois.
18
  The Fox were pushed so far west that they were forced to 
invade Sioux hunting grounds and, eventually, they were surrounded on all sides by 
people who did not like them. Because of their precarious location and constant need to 
defend themselves, the Fox developed a war-like reputation, prone to killing French 
traders in the woods simply because “they disliked beards” and described by historians as 
“a cruel nation,” possessing a “habitual warlike resolve” and a “fierce barbaric 
impulse.”
19
 
Despite their animosity towards the French, and whether or not it stemmed from 
French facial hair or French inclinations to trade with the hated Sioux, the Fox were 
invited to Montreal in 1701 and Miskousouath, a Fox chief, signed the Grand 
Settlement.
20
  The inclusion of the Fox in France‟s enormous Indian alliance benefitted 
the French because it secured another trade partner and helped stabilize the region, and it 
benefitted the Fox because it provided French protection from enemies of the Fox, of 
which there many. The inclusion of the Fox, however, also further intensified the already-
volatile situation in the region by irking other tribes in the alliance, many of whom 
considered the Fox “irreconcilable foes.”
21
 Undaunted, the French “persisted in their 
efforts to join these peoples „together in feelings of peace and union,‟ hoping to avoid 
taking sides in a dispute among peoples they considered allies.”
22
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 Edmunds and Peyser, 9.  
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 For Fox hatred of French beards, see Kellogg, 147 … for “fierce barbaric impulse,” also see Kellogg, 302 
… for other unflattering Fox descriptions, see Brett Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars and the Limits of 
Alliance,” The William and Mary Quarterly 63 (2006): 55 … Rushforth cites Mesaiger to du Tisne, 15 
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Supplement to Europe” (Toronto, Ontario, 1987), 46.    
20
 Edmunds and Peyser, 60. 
21
 Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars and the Limits of Alliance,” 58. 
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 Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars and the Limits of Alliance,” 59. 
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With the founding of Detroit in 1701, the same year the Grand Settlement was 
enacted, the French continued to push their luck in recklessly attempting to make friends 
out of blood enemies. Detroit was the brainchild of Antoine de Lamothe Cadillac, a 
minor aristocrat from a poor family of southern France who migrated to North America 
around 1683 and in 1694 became commander of the French post at Michilimackinac, 
located at the northern tip of the lower peninsula of present-day Michigan. Cadillac, of 
whom it was written: “no one ever accused [him] … of underestimating his own 
abilities,”
23
 became annoyed with France‟s non-intervention policy concerning Indians 
and proposed the construction of a fort at Detroit. Once he took command of the fort, he 
planned to relocate several of France‟s Algonquin allies to the Detroit region, forming an 
Indian Babylon, of sorts. Such a force of French-aligned Indians, Cadillac argued, “would 
both preclude British influence and serve as a base for future campaigns against the 
Iroquois.”
24
 It would also centralize the fur trade, and make it easier for the French to 
regulate. “The post of Detroit is indisputably the most suitable as regards the security of 
the trade … “ Cadillac wrote to Vaudreuil in 1702. “It is a very different matter when 
savages come and trade under the bastion of a fort. There they take care to make no 
venture and offer no insult because they know well that they would be compelled to 
conduct themselves properly.”
25
 France would make a fortune, and so would Cadillac. 
Despite objections from Jesuit missionaries in the area, Cadillac used his 
connections with Jerome Phelypeaux de Pontchartrain, the French minister of the marine, 
to obtain permission to establish Detroit in July of 1701. Within months, Cadillac 
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 Edmunds and Peyser, 55. 
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 Edmunds and Peyser, 56. 
25
 Cadillac to Vaudreuil, 25 September 1702, Michigan Pioneers and Historical Collections, 144. 
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convinced large contingents of Ottawa and Huron to build villages near the walls of 
Detroit. In 1702, Miami and Chippewa villages “added to the burgeoning Indian 
population.”
26
 The early years of Cadillac‟s social experiment were good. Trade was 
prosperous. Schools and windmills were built. A blacksmith settled at the fort. The 
population of the settlement blossomed. Cadillac even nicknamed his post “The Paris of 
America;” however, beneath Detroit‟s luster was a brimming tin keg of age-old Indian 
rivalries and grudges that the French either could not see or refused to acknowledge.
27
 A 
clash between the Ottawa and a joint Huron and Miami coalition in 1706 shattered 
Detroit‟s five-year honeymoon phase, and revealed Cadillac‟s loosening grip on control 
over the Indians he brought there. “The savages make great complaints against M. la 
Motte [Cadillac],” Francois Clairambault d‟Aigremont wrote in a 1708 inspection of 
Detroit. “This man has much influence among them, but little management.”
28
 The 
Ottowa and Huron/Miami dustup, though, was just a warm-up round. Indian affairs at 
Detroit did not really get interesting until the Fox showed up in 1710. 
---------- 
Despite a formal invitation from Cadillac, the Fox were holdouts for many years, 
and for this reason: they did not like anyone who lived at Detroit. Following the Grand 
Settlement of 1701, the Fox were contractually allied with the French and many of the 
Indian tribes that settled near Cadillac‟s “Paris of America;” however, reality was a 
different story. The Fox‟s relationship with the French was constantly undermined by 
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French trade flirtations with the reviled Sioux, and the Fox‟s relationship with all the 
other Algonquin peoples that lived outside the walls of Detroit was constantly 
undermined by years of ancient feuding.
29
       
Yet, by 1710, many of the Fox‟s neighbors had migrated to Detroit, leaving the 
Fox isolated and without trade partners.
30
 The holdout was over. That year, two villages 
of Fox travelled from Wisconsin to southern Michigan, only to find that Cadillac, the 
man who invited them there, had gone south to be the governor of Louisiana. Perhaps 
feeling betrayed, or perhaps always intending to do menace, the Fox acted out upon their 
arrival at Detroit. They stole French livestock, started quarrels with neighboring tribes, 
openly talked about trading with the English and “did all of this with an arrogance and 
ready violence that alarmed all the nations.”
31
  
The unruliness of the Fox became such an issue that Vaudreuil summoned Fox 
leaders to Montreal and advised them to move back to Wisconsin. “I learnt today … that 
you think yourselves masters of that place [Detroit] … and you have brought nothing but 
disorder, and have shed the blood of my children there,” Vaudreuil said, in a stern 
rebuking of the Fox in 1711. “My opinion is that you would do better to go back to your 
old village, where the bones of your father are.”
32
 It did not work, and, in 1712, an 
Ottawa chief named Saguima took matters into his own hands. Saguima convinced 
Cadillac‟s interim successor, Jacques-Charles Renaud Dubuisson, that the Fox were 
plotting a revolt against the French, then gathered a force of Ottawa, Huron, 
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Potowatomis, Illinois and Miamis (the same tribe the Ottawa had warred against five 
years earlier) to attack the Fox. According to R. David Edmunds and Joseph L. Peyser in 
their book The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France, the French would 
have preferred if Saguima had merely forced the Fox – who were profitable trade partners 
– to return to Wisconsin, but the Huron, in particular, seemed hell-bent on exterminating 
the brash Mesquakie for good.
33
 Upon being besieged by the Algonquin coalition, the 
outnumbered Fox pleaded for French intervention, but Dubuisson, who believed 
Saguima‟s Fox uprising yarn, provided none. In fact, the French aided Saguima‟s forces 
in the battle with Fox. Incensed by this perceived betrayal by the French, the Fox chief 
Pemoussa shouted to the French:  
What does this mean, my Father? Thou didst invite us to come dwell near three;  
… and yet thou declares war against us … and yet thou are joining our enemies to 
eat us. But know that the Renard is immortal; and that if in defending myself I 
shed the blood of Frenchmen, my father cannot reproach me.
34
  
The Fox withstood the siege for 19 days, and then escaped on a rainy night. They did not 
get far, however, before Saguima‟s forces caught up with them and, after four more days 
of intense fighting, beat the Fox into submission. Fox prisoners were divvied up between 
the allies and, as promised, the Huron “did not spare a single one of theirs.”
35
 
 White wrote of the 1712 massacre: “The victims would not forget their 
betrayal.”
36
 A majority of the Fox still dwelled in Wisconsin, and that majority was 
committed to revenge. In a letter to Pontchartrain, Joseph Marest, a Jesuit missionary in 
the area, wrote that “The Fox nation is not destroyed,” and pointed out that the Fox and 
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allies such as the Kickapoo and Mascouten still accounted for nearly 500 warriors 
dwelling around Green Bay. Marest then warned that “ … if these all unite, as is natural, 
they may yet excite terror … they would indeed be truly formidable, because so many of 
them are boatmen. The French … will always be in danger; for the Foxes, Kickapoos and 
Mascoutins are found everywhere, and they are a people without pity and without 
reason.”
37
  
Marest was right. In the following years, the Fox dispersed into the woods and 
caused mayhem in the Upper Country, recklessly murdering French traders and waging a 
guerilla war on the Detroit tribes involved in Saguima‟s coalition. The fear generated by 
the Fox‟s reign of terror strangled the fur trade in the Great Lakes region, a map of which 
can be seen in Figure 1. It was a scenario from a fairy tale: everyone in the Upper 
Country was afraid to go into the woods on their own. 
 
Figure 1.  Map of the Upper Country, New France, 1730 
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In 1713, Vaudreuil wrote that the local Indians were staying close to Detroit for 
“fear of having their heads broken” if they ventured far away. French traders, meanwhile, 
were “dying of hunger in their cabins, not daring to leave … the merchants will have a 
gloomy confirmation of this, this year, on seeing how little peltry has come down to 
Michilimackinac.”
38
 
Marest begged Pontchartrain to send help to the embattled region. “If this country 
ever needs M. Louvigny, it is now,” he wrote in a 1712 correspondence to the minister.
39
 
However, it took four years – four years during which the Fox “infested the trade routes” 
and caused “havoc to French commerce in the west,” – before Louis de La Porte de 
Louvigny, a French military officer in the region was finally commissioned to lead an 
expedition into Wisconsin to silence the unrest.
40
 In the summer of 1716, Louvigny, who 
was commanding an army comprised of about 800 French soldiers and allied Indians, 
pushed north from Green Bay and laid siege to a fortified Fox village built, and built 
well, one year earlier to defend the Fox against a specific military operation: the siege. 
French cannonballs proved ineffective against the village‟s sturdy oak walls, and when 
the French attempted to dig trenches around the fort in which to plant mines, the Fox 
poured fire down on them.
41
 Still, after four days of siege, the Fox raised a white flag and 
attempted a route of diplomacy. It worked. To the dismay of the bloodthirsty allied 
Indians at the siege who were hoping to gleefully terminate more of their long-time foes, 
Louvigny granted peace to the Fox, pending a number of terms, including the payment of 
reparations to the French and their allies in the form of peltry and prisoners. The most 
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important term of the surrender, however, was that the Fox, simply, agreed to be peaceful 
going forward.
42
  
 It is realistic to think that Louvigny never had intentions to eliminate the Fox. One 
year earlier, he had delivered a report to the French courts that warned against the use of 
military force against western Indians.
43
 When he laid siege to the village, he met 
resistance from a well-prepared Fox contingent, but his force nearly doubled that of the 
Fox, and he had time on his side. Eventually, the French would have worn down the Fox. 
Louvigny‟s mission was a mission of peace from the outset, because the French believed 
peace and stability in the region would return the fur trade to its previously profitable 
ways. Edmunds and Peyser wrote of Louvigny‟s expedition: “what had begun ostensibly 
as a military campaign had deteriorated in a commercial venture.”
44
 White referred to it 
as “a peace mission disguised as an army.”
45
 Louvigny, himself, did not deny the loot he 
procured while on the, supposed, military mission. “The result of these Voyages has been 
the establishment of peace among all the Nations with whom the French trade,” Louvigny 
boasted in a letter to Louis Alexandre de Bourbon, count de Toulouse “ … and an 
Extraordinary abundance of rich and valuable peltries, of which we have never seen so 
great a quantity in Canada.”
46
 Whatever his intentions, Louvigny returned home a hero. 
He had subdued the Fox while simultaneously forcing them to hand over canoe-loads of 
peltry. He had also reignited the fur trade in the Upper Country. The Coureur des bois no 
longer feared for their scalps, and the waterways of the lower Great Lakes were, once 
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again, open for business. Yet, despite the praise heaped upon the band of French heroes at 
their triumphant return to Montreal, Louvigny left behind a dangerous situation brewing 
in the west. The French-allied Indians who participated in the siege walked away feeling 
cheated. Their bloodlust had not been satisfied.  
 The Fox were a loyal people. In 1715, when the French and several Detroit tribes 
attacked two of their allies, the Mascouten and the Kickapoo, Pemoussa made the risky 
decision to leave his village vulnerable by leading a large party of Fox warriors to their 
friends‟ aid. So it was that, despite their seemingly genuine attempts to adhere to 
Louvigny‟s terms of surrender in the years following 1716, the Fox were eventually 
pulled back into warfare by their unwavering allegiance to their allies. In 1718, open 
warfare broke out on the border of Illinois country between the Illinois and the Fox‟s old 
friends, the Mascouten and the Kickapoo. The Fox, at first, tried to stay out of the 
conflict, and Ouchala, a respected Fox chief, even attempted to mediate between the 
warring tribes. The Illinois, however, “refused to differentiate” between the Mascouten, 
the Kickapoo and the Fox and, by 1719, several Fox hunters had been murdered in the 
woods by Illinois war parties.
47
 Not even Vaudreuil could blame the Fox for going on the 
offensive at that point: “The Renards were less in the wrong than the Illinois for the war 
they have had together … Besides, it is not Surprising that, after having been attacked 
four successive times without making an reprisals, [the Fox] should have been aroused 
the Fifth time they were attacked,” he wrote in a letter in 1723. Vaudreuil, however, 
added in the letter: “It is of the utmost Importance to prevent the first movements of [the 
Fox] from going too far, and to guarantee the upper country from a War which would 
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result in a general Conflagration.”
48
 Vaudreuil‟s warning of an Upper Country 
conflagration, though, might have come too late. 
 The war between the Fox and the Illinois escalated in the years that followed. Fox 
war parties moved south and struck back at the Illinois. The Illinois responded by 
catching the Fox war parties before they made it back to Wisconsin, routing them and 
later torturing the prisoners they had previously spared. Ouchala, a traditional advocate of 
peace, then went on the warpath, leading a large army of Fox warriors into Illinois 
country and chasing a village of Illinois to Starved Rock, a “towering precipice” that 
overlooked the Illinois River. Because Starved Rock was deemed “impregnable,” 
Ouchala and his warriors waited out the besieged Illinois until hunger set in and the 
Illinois sued for peace.
49
 Ouchala, wisely, granted that peace. Other, more volatile, Fox 
chiefs, however, were not as wise. In 1720, Fox warriors from the village of a younger, 
less-wise chief named Elcevas murdered a Chippewa Indian, which sparked on-again, 
off-again warfare between the Fox and Chippewa over the next several years. Edmunds 
and Peyser wrote of the highly-explosive situation in the Upper Country in the early 
1720s: “The prospects of a widening Indian war in the western Great Lakes did not bode 
well for the fur trade.”
50
 
 One of the growing reasons such a war did not bode well for the fur trade was 
because it cut off the French from a powerful and tantalizing potential trade partner: the 
Sioux. The Sioux lived to the west of the Fox, the Illinois and the Chippewa, and, to the 
French, they represented an untapped, and possibly lucrative, resource in the fur trade. In 
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fact, the French desired to build a fort in Sioux country. In a 1724 letter to the 
commandant Boisbriant, Vaudreuil wrote: “You are not ignorant of the fact that The 
Establishment in the syoux country, which the Court has greatly at Heart, will be … 
advantageous to the all the settlements along the Mississipy.”
51
 There was a problem, 
however, and that was getting to Sioux country. In order to get there, French traders had 
to negotiate their way through an orgy of Indian fighting, a battleground that included 
incensed Fox warriors, a group that had never had qualms with killing French traders, 
incensed or not. “But, as one cannot conveniently go there except through the country of 
the renards, and as that way is closed because of the war that is now raging,” Vaudreuil 
continued in his letter. “It is necessary to Begin at once to reconcile those two nations.”
52
 
 By “those two nations,” Vaudreuil was referring to the Fox and the Illinois. The 
war between the Fox and the Illinois was more potent than the war between the Fox and 
the Chippewa, and for one reason: The Illinois still held Fox prisoners as slaves, and the 
Fox wanted those prisoners back. The Fox appealed to the French many times for help in 
retrieving their kinsmen who had become slaves at the hands of the Illinois. A French 
officer, Constant Marchand de Lignery, wrote: “When peace was made in 1716, [the Fox] 
sent the Illinois back their prisoners while the Illinois did not return theirs, as had been 
agreed upon in the treaty. Thus … I consider that it is necessary, if we wish to secure this 
peace between them, to commence by accomplishing that.”
53
 Even Vaudreuil knew of the 
Fox slaves held by the Illinois, and he seemed concerned about it. In another letter to 
Boisbriant, Vaudreuil wrote: “I have Been Informed that the Illinois had not yet given 
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any satisfaction to the renards with regard to their prisoners … I think you feel with me 
that it is Important to induce that tribe to send back in good faith the prisoners of the 
others.”
54
  
The ironic twist, of course, was that Vaudreuil, himself, owned Fox slaves. As 
Brett Rushforth astutely points out in his article, “Slavery, the Fox Wars and the Limits 
of Alliance, “to avoid difficult questions, Governor Vaudreuil never mentioned to his 
French superiors that his household, like scores of others in New France, was served by 
Fox slaves who had been captured in the very attacks he claimed to oppose.”
55
 The 
French began collecting Fox slaves following the 1712 massacre, and the Detroit tribes 
continued to raid Fox villages and provide the French with Fox slaves in the years that 
followed, possibly as a conscious strategy to drive a wedge between the two sides. If so, 
the conscious strategy worked. No matter how desperately the French wanted peace with 
the Fox so that the fur trade could prosper in the Upper Country, such a peace was never 
truly palpable while so many Fox remained enslaved by the French. Rushforth refers to 
the French possession of Fox slaves as the “the most significant issue perpetuating the 
Fox Wars” in the 1720s, noting that every documented complaint made by the Fox 
beginning in 1718 concerned the release of Fox slaves from French homes.
56
 When no 
such release occurred, the always-unstable relationship between the French and the Fox 
disintegrated, permanently. In a 1727 correspondence to the courts, Charles de la 
Boische, marquis de Beauharnois, the governor-general of New France following 
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Vaudreuil‟s death in 1725, wrote, simply, of the grim situation: “The Renards have said 
that they would no longer suffer any French among them.”
57
  
By 1728, the French had outlined a policy of genocide to be implemented on the 
Fox. Talks of peace were no more. “His Majesty is persuaded of the necessity of 
destroying that Nation [the Fox],” a chilling letter from Versailles instructed 
Beauharnois. “ … It cannot keep quiet, and it will cause, so long as it exists, both trouble 
and disorder in the Upper country.”
58
 Lignery commanded the first expedition into 
Wisconsin in the summer of 1728, and, behind an imposing force of nearly 1,700 French 
soldiers and allied Indians, victory seemed imminent. It, however, was not. The mission 
was a calamity. The French intended to surprise the Fox in their villages and register an 
all-out, definitive victory. Keeping an army of 1,700 people a secret, however, was 
tricky, and the Fox eventually caught wind of the advancing marauders. Although some 
warriors wanted to stay and defend their homeland, the severely-outnumbered Fox, 
wisely, broke camp and withdrew even further west towards the Mississippi River. When 
Lignery and his troops reached the Fox villages, they found them deserted, except for an 
older Fox woman and her granddaughter, whom they questioned, and a stubborn Fox 
warrior, whom they tortured.
59
 Lignery then ordered four of the Fox villages and all of 
their surrounding cornfields to be burned, turned his army around and went home. In a 
report to Beauharnois, Lignery touted his mission as “advantageous to the glory of the 
King and the welfare of both Colonies, inasmuch as one-half those people will die of 
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hunger.”
60
 He spent most of the same report, however, bemoaning the condition of his 
canoes, lamenting the mutinous attitude of the Coureur des bois attached to his army and 
pleading to Beauharnois for “protection” from “the minister,” all of which indicated 
Lignery understood that the expedition, at its essence, was a failure.
61
 The Fox had 
escaped. 
The Fox returned to find their homes burned and their crops destroyed; however, 
the French had retreated from Wisconsin and “the Mesquakies had survived.”
62
 That, in 
itself, was a victory. The triumph, though, was short-lived, as all triumphs were for the 
Fox in the final years of the wars that bore their name. When Beauharnois considered 
granting peace to the Fox in 1729, “allied Indians pressed their agenda, attacking Fox 
settlements, killing hundreds …” The rate at which the attacks came was “stunning.”
63
 
Enemies of the Fox bore down on all sides. The French made contact with such western 
tribes as the Sioux and the Iowa and convinced them not to harbor the Fox. There was no 
escape. Soon, even the Fox‟s most reliable allies, the Kickapoo and the Mascouten, 
joined the side of the French. The Winnebago, probably sensing the end was near, 
betrayed the Fox, as well.  
The Fox‟s lone salvation, ironically, was the Iroquois, the imperialistic, pro-
English tribe that had instigated the Fox‟s migration to Wisconsin in the first place. The 
Seneca, the western-most nation of the Iroquois confederacy, lived along the St. 
Lawrence River Valley, which was a long and arduous journey from Wisconsin. Still, the 
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Fox had no other choice. They were being slowly annihilated in the Upper Country. So, 
in June of 1730, nearly 300 Fox warriors and 600 Fox women and children abandoned 
their villages and headed east. The Fox had barely made it around the tip of Lake 
Michigan when they were engaged by the Illinois in early-August near the St. Joseph 
River. During the initial battle, a joint force of Kickapoo and Mascouten joined in on the 
side of the Illinois. Incensed, “The Renards cried out to the [Kickapoo] and the 
[Mascouten] that they would make their supper off them.”
64
 Possibly motivated by the 
sight of their former allies-turned-enemies, the Fox beat back their attackers long enough 
to construct a fort, there, in the prairie of northern Illinois; an ideal location for one, final 
stand. 
In the days that followed, new and old Fox enemies from all over the Upper 
Country converged on the St. Joseph River to participate in the siege of the Fox‟s 
helpless prairie fort. Robert Groston de St. Ange, the French commander of Fort de 
Chartres in southern Illinois, rounded up French troops and Creole traders and headed 
north. Nicolas-Antoine Coulon de Villiers, the French commander of Fort St. Joseph, 
rallied a force of Sac, Potawatomi and Miami Indians and marched to the fort. In early 
September, even a band of Huron, that age-old blood enemy of the Fox, arrived bearing a 
dispatch from Beauharnois that forbade any negotiated settlements with the Fox. It was 
official: “no quarter would be given.”
65
 The French had outlined a policy of genocide to 
be implemented on the Fox, and genocide it would be. 
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The Fox‟s exodus had failed. A Seneca rescue party was not coming. The 
Mesquakie were outnumbered and besieged on all sides by enemies, huddled in a dank 
fort on a lonely prairie far from the hardwood forests of their homeland in southern 
Wisconsin. Yet, they persisted. They persisted long enough, at least, to escape during a 
fierce thunderstorm on the night of September 8. However, “the very conditions that 
facilitated their escape also precipitated their capture.”
66
 The rain and wind slowed the 
Fox, and it dampened their musket powder. When the French and allied Indians caught 
up with the Fox on the open grasslands, the ensuing fight was violent and lopsided. The 
battered and exhausted Fox simply had no defense left to muster. In all, nearly 200 Fox 
warriors were killed, along with nearly 300 Fox women and children. Only about 450 
Fox were spared, and most of them were taken as prisoners by allied Indians who 
participated in the massacre. In a triumphant letter to the French minister, Beauharnois 
wrote:  
The Renards, in Conjunction with the [Mascouten] and the [Kickapoo], had waged open 
war on us and our Savage allies for many years; they Surprised our detachments, carried 
off our Voyageurs, frustrated all our plans and Harassed us Even in our settlements … 
Attempts had been made on several occasions to destroy them; But lack of Concert, the 
Spirit of self-interest, and the bad Management of those who at various times were 
Entrusted with that undertaking, always caused it to miscarry. Finally an event has 
occurred that brought about their disunion and the destruction of the renards.
67
 
Following the massacre of 1730, the Fox would never again pose a major threat to French 
operations in the New World. 
---------- 
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 Something interesting happened while the French had the Fox pinned down with a 
constant barrage of attacks from 1728 to 1730: A French fort was established in Sioux 
country. In June of 1728, around the same time Lignery embarked on his mission to 
attack the Fox, a French officer named Rene Boucher, Sieur de la Perriere (who later 
played a large role in turning the Kickapoo and Mascouten against the Fox) led a small 
troop of men out of Montreal, across Lake Huron and Lake Michigan, through Fox-
occupied Wisconsin and into the unknown wilds of the west. There, on Lake Petin, an 
abnormally wide section of the Mississippi River in southeastern Minnesota, Perriere and 
his men paid homage to their governor by constructing Fort Beauharnois in a matter of 
just four days. The completion of the fort was met with great rejoicing: “It was on this 
occasion that the wine of the Sioux was made to flow,” Father Guignas, a French 
missionary who accompanied Perriere on his mission, gleefully wrote in a letter to 
Beauharnois. Then, probably drunkenly, the French set off fireworks, which caused the 
terrified Sioux, who were also probably drunk, to stop rejoicing, tremble and plead for 
the French to stop making the stars fall from the sky. The entire ordeal, as described by 
Father Guignas, was humorously discombobulated.
68
 Just months later, another 
humorously discombobulated event occurred: all of the Sioux left. They gathered up their 
families and their dwellings and moved away from the area surrounding Fort 
Beauharnois. Many French officials, who had never dealt with Plains Indians before and, 
therefore, knew nothing of the great buffalo hunts that occurred in the spring, were 
rightfully alarmed. “Shortly after the arrival of the French those Savages started on their 
hunt as they are in the habit of doing for their Subsistence,” Beauharnois wrote calmingly 
to a clearly-concerned French minister, before adding: “ … the Importance of 
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maintaining that Establishment [Fort Beauharnois] seems to me to be indispensably 
necessary.”
69
 
 Fort Beauharnois was “indispensably necessary,” as Beauharnois himself put it, 
because of the trade it facilitated. Fort Beauharnois was a fort only by name. In reality, it 
was a trading post, and it represented France‟s first major foray into the lucrative 
commercial opportunities the massive Sioux tribe represented. For years, the French had 
designs to tap into that great western resource, but, for years, they had been stifled by the 
Fox. In order to get to Sioux country, French traders had to pass through Fox country, 
and that was something not many of them were willing to do. However, with the Fox 
neutralized by a rapid wave of attacks from the French and their allies in the waning 
years of the 1720s, Wisconsin, suddenly, was not so intimidating and trade with "one of 
the most powerful western tribes, dwelling in one of the richest fur countries in the 
continent” was on.
70
 
The story of the erection of Fort Beauharnois is important because it is indicative 
of what drove the French to exterminate the Fox: trade. New France‟s “economic life 
rested upon the fur trade,” and it was the fur trade, above all else, that dictated how the 
French dealt with Indians in the Upper Country at the end of the seventeenth century and 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Fox were detrimental to the fur trade. In 
even stronger diction, the Fox “paralyzed the fur trade.”
71
 They brashly scalped French 
traders. They incessantly warred with neighboring tribes, which effectively distracted 
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those neighboring tribes from trading with the French. Their mere presence prevented 
substantial economic contact with the peltry-rich Sioux to the west. All of this 
precipitated the Fox‟s demise. When Beauharnois was instructed to implement a war of 
extermination upon the Fox in 1728, it was not a show of support for French-allied tribes 
that despised the Fox, it was not to gain territory in Wisconsin and it was not avenge the 
murder of French traders around the western Great Lakes; it was to protect and advance 
the fur trade interests of New France and, thus, the interests of New France, in general. It 
was no coincidence that Lignery‟s expedition against the Fox and Perriere‟s trade mission 
into Sioux territory occurred, almost, simultaneously. The French were making their 
intentions clear. They would quell the Fox threat and then, immediately, continue 
bartering beaver pelts with the more powerful Indian tribes beyond. 
Although no one involved could have predicted it, the construction of Fort 
Beauharnois and, more generally, the Fox Wars were taking place at the end of an era, 
however. The French fur trade in North America had reached its zenith and, by the late 
1730s and early 1740s, was entering into a state of decline. Evidence of the decline was 
vague, but, nonetheless, compelling. Two years after its construction in 1728, Fort 
Beauharnois folded. By 1738, French officials were writing to Beauharnois, demanding 
answers. “The falling off in the Beaver trade,” Beauharnois pleaded to a French official 
in a letter from October of 1738, was due to the low price of beaver skins. Beauharnois 
then informed the official that he had ordered all French traders to raise the price of their 
beaver skins. “This,” he boasted, “has contributed not a little to increase this year‟s 
30 
 
Receipts.”
72
 It was a quick fix, though – a reactionary one – and, eventually, it only made 
matters worse. White wrote of the decaying situation in the Upper Country: 
By 1745 there were serious shortages of trade goods in the West … Some goods 
reached the upper country, but [French] traders demanded far more than the 
customary prices for them … Some Indians reacted to the changes in exchange 
rates by refusing to pay for goods advanced them for their hunts; others began to 
attack and plunder French trade canoes.
73
 
The French soon lost many of their trade allies to the English and the Dutch, and, by the 
end of the French and Indian War, the significance of the fur trade had significantly 
dropped throughout New France.
74
 The “economic life” of the colony no longer rested on 
beaver peltry. “In 1755,” White wrote, “one French strategist admitted that the fur trade 
of the Great Lakes and the Ohio Valley was not worth 1 percent of the expense that it had 
cost the Crown.”
75
 Nothing illustrates that point, or the direction New France was headed, 
better than the Treaty of Paris, which ended the French and Indian War in 1763. In that 
treaty, France ceded all of Canada – thousands of miles of some of the richest fur country 
in the world – to England in exchange for Guadeloupe, Martinique and several other tiny 
islands in the Caribbean Sea. In terms of territory, the cession made little sense; however, 
Guadeloupe and Martinique possessed something Canada did not: rich, fertile soil, and 
the lucrative cash crops that grew from that soil. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NATCHEZ WARS 
 When the French entered Louisiana near the end of the seventeenth century, they 
were entering an entirely new world. The French had settled, originally, in a land of 
commerce, alliances and beaver peltry. They were now entering a land of soil.
76
 In a 1704 
letter, Ponchartrain wrote to Jean Baptiste le Moyne, Sieur De Bienville, one of the early 
French explorers in the region: “It is very important that you apply yourself carefully to 
the cultivation of the land.” Pontchartrain then added an interesting aside. “Tobacco will 
probably grow very well there and will be of the quality of that of Virginia,” He wrote. 
“On these [tobacco] plantations follow as far as you can the method of the English 
colonies about which you can obtain information.”
77
  
Pontchartrain‟s emphasis on the significance of land deviated from traditional 
French policy in the New World. In the Upper Country, letters often came from France 
ordering officials to cultivate relationships with local Indians.
78
 In Louisiana, those letters 
ordered officials to cultivate the Earth. However, it was Pontchartrain‟s latter assertion 
about stealing English tobacco methods that implied a truly major shift in French dogma. 
For more than a century, the French, latecomers to North America, had contented 
themselves to lurk in the shadowy rivers and hardwood forests surrounding the Great 
Lakes, isolated from much of the truly imperial action taking place on the continent. By 
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the early-eighteenth century, though, France had emerged as England‟s principal North 
American rival, and with the fur trade slowly declining, new French policy began to take 
shape. The new policy strayed from the profit-oriented, sparsely-populated, male-
dominated forts, trading posts and mercantile settlements that trademarked France‟s early 
years in North America to an actual attempt to settle North America with inhabitants and 
challenge England, outright, for possession of the continent. 
Possession of the continent was dependent on colonists, and attracting colonists to 
Louisiana was dependent on land from which those colonists could make a living. Some 
of the most fertile land in all of Louisiana was inhabited by the Natchez Indians. Nearly 
all early accounts of the Natchez indicate that they were a displaced people; a refugee 
tribe unlike any other along the lower Mississippi River. Per their own creation myth, the 
Natchez originated from a “beautiful region of the Southwest,” and because they bore a 
strong resemblance to the Aztecs – sun-worshipping, human-sacrificing mound builders – 
most historians have deduced that this “beautiful region of the Southwest” was Mexico.
79
 
Intertribal warfare forced the Natchez north to the Rocky Mountains and then east to 
present-day Mississippi, where, around the turn of the 13
th
 century, they settled on bluffs 
overlooking the eastern bank of the longest river in North America. From that ideally-
elevated location, the Natchez and their ancestors prospered into a powerful, expansive 
culture, militarily and agriculturally dominant among the Mississippian mound-building 
tribes in that region for many centuries.  
When the Spanish Conquistador Hernando De Soto crossed the lower Mississippi 
River in the mid-sixteenth century, his encounter with the Natchez was short-lived and 
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violent, and it ended with De Soto‟s men fleeing for their lives. De Soto held many chiefs 
for ransom during his rampage throughout the Southeast, often luring them into traps by 
claiming to be the son of the Sun. When he demanded parley, however, with the cacique 
of Quigualtam, a tribe that many historians believe to be ancestors of the Natchez, he 
received a surprisingly impertinent response:  
As to what you say of your being the son of the Sun, if you will cause him to dry 
up the great river [the Mississippi], I will believe you; As to the rest of it, it is not 
my custom to visit any one … if you desire to see me, come where I am, if for 
peace, I will receive you with special good will; if for war, I will await you in my 
town; but neither for you, nor for any other man, will I set back one foot.  
It was enough to intimidate the ruthless Conquistador, as he and his men promptly 
vacated the area. De Soto died soon after departing; however, his men, then led by Luis 
Moscoso de Alvarado, continued travelling in a southwesterly direction, before looping 
around and heading back through Quigualtam territory. It was a grave mistake. The 
Spaniards‟ boats were attacked by large canoes of Quigualtam warriors. The Indians were 
able to overturn some of the Spanish crafts and several Spaniards “sank like stones” due 
to the weight of their armor.
80
 
The encounter with De Soto‟s men, despite its outcome and brevity, might have 
played a role in unleashing an epidemic that decimated the population of the Natchez and 
several other Mississippian tribes over the next century and a half. By the time the French 
arrived in the region in the late seventeenth century, the Natchez were in their twilight. 
The last of the great Mississippian mound-building cultures had been reduced to a 
modest, but proud group of about 4,000 people inhabiting nine small villages atop the 
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same bluffs their ancestors had settled nearly 500 years earlier … bluffs that would soon 
spell the end for the Natchez. 
 Much of what is known about the Natchez at the dawn of the eighteenth century 
comes from the writings of Antoine-Simon Le Page du Pratz, a Dutch-born, French-
raised historian and naturalist who lived among the Natchez from 1720-1728. Le Page du 
Pratz was a seasoned traveller, even before he arrived in Louisiana in 1718. When he was 
in his early twenties, he explored the Great Plains along the Missouri River with his 
friend Claude-Charles du Tisne and interacted with a variety of “Naturals,” as Le Page du 
Pratz called Indians.  
Le Page du Pratz translated this prior experience with Indians into eight peaceful 
years among the Natchez. He seemed to fall in love with the tribe, befriending the chief, 
the Great Sun, and his brother, the Tattooed Serpent, and writing of the Natchez: “Their 
manners were more civilized, their manner of thinking more just and full of sentiment, 
their customs more reasonable, and their ceremonies more natural and serious – 
distinguishing this nation from all others. It was easy to recognize them as more refined 
and polite.”
81
  
 Le Page du Pratz‟s descriptions of the Natchez – from their physical appearance 
(“extremely well-made … their legs seem as if they were sculpted in a mould; they are 
muscular, and their calves are firm.”
82
) to their sense of justice (“They have no police 
among them except reason, because in following exactly the law of nature they have no 
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contentions, and thus have no need for judges.”
83
) – are somewhat compromised by the 
overly idyllic, sometimes Utopian portrait he paints. However, his writings offer a rare 
glimpse into Natchez society and cannot be overlooked. According to Le Page du Pratz, 
the Natchez were a male-dominated people. Even the youngest male was placed ahead of 
the oldest female on the pecking order, meaning, at mealtimes, “a two-year old boy is 
served before his mother.”
84
 The preeminent male of the tribe, the Great Sun, ruled with a 
rare, despotic authority that could:  
… be compared only to that of the first Ottoman emperors. He is, like them, 
absolute master of the lives and estates of his subjects. He disposes of them 
according to his pleasure; his will is the only law … When he orders a man who 
has merited it to be put to death, the unhappy condemned individual neither begs, 
nor makes intercession for his life, nor seeks to escape. The order of the sovereign 
is executed on the spot and no one objects.
85
 
Yet, females played a uniquely-important role in Natchez society because they, 
alone, transferred nobility. There were two classes among the Natchez: nobility (divided 
into Suns, Nobles and Honored Men) and Stinkards, or commoners. Le Page du Pratz 
pointed out, rightfully so, that Stinkards did not like to be called Stinkards, “a name 
which offends them, and which no one dares to pronounce before them, for it would put 
them in very bad humor.”
86
 Because all the nobility were descendants of the Sun and, 
thus, related, the Natchez caste system was fluid, as the nobility had to intermarry with 
the Stinkards. Males enjoyed the privilege of nobility “only individually and during their 
lifetime.”
87
 The children that male Suns had with Stinkards were docked a rank to 
Nobles, and the male children that Nobles had with Stinkards were reduced even further 
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to Honored Men. This rule, however, did not apply to women. Nobility was maintained 
from female Suns to their children. Therefore, the oldest male son of the female Sun 
ascended the throne to become the worshipped Great Sun.
88
 
 Despite portraying the Natchez as the ideal “Noble Savages” throughout much of 
his writing, there was one aspect of Natchez society that Le Page du Pratz depicted only 
as savage: human sacrifice.  Upon the death of the Great Sun‟s brother, the Tattooed 
Serpent, in 1725, “the favorite wife of the deceased, a second wife, whom he kept in 
another village, to visit when his favorite wife was pregnant, his chancellor, his doctor, 
his head servant, his pipe bearer, and some old women” were all ritualistically strangled 
at the burial.
89
 Infanticide also took place at Natchez burials, as mothers sacrificed their 
babies in hopes of having honors or, perhaps, a class promotion conferred to them: 
“Death was always by strangling with a hempen cord. Victims were hooded, seated on a 
mat and garroted from behind.”
90
 Le Page du Pratz did not condemn the Natchez tradition 
of human sacrifice on the grounds of barbarism, though. He condemned human sacrifice 
because it was so popular and widespread following the death of a Sun that it slowly 
annihilated the population of the Natchez. When the Great Sun spoke of committing 
suicide following the death of his beloved little brother, Le Page du Pratz worried that 
“the death of the two Suns, who were the first of their nation, would take with them a 
large part of the people.”
91
 Le Page du Pratz later summarized: “This custom is fatal to 
this great Nation, since it has greatly contributed to its destruction, as one has already 
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been able to see.”
92
 It is possible that widespread human sacrifice, not a European-borne 
epidemic, was to blame for the Natchez‟s weakened condition upon the arrival of the 
French at the turn of the eighteenth century. 
 Le Page du Pratz departed from the Natchez in 1728, four years before the 
extermination of the tribe. However, before he left, he witnessed a foreboding event. One 
evening, he watched a radiant sunset from his courtyard, saying: “It would be very 
difficult to describe all of the beauties that these different colorations brought to the eyes. 
But all of it together was the most beautiful sight of this type that I had ever seen in my 
life.” Immediately, though, two Indian neighbors came to his house and expressed fear 
over the sunset. According to the Natchez, the vibrant redness of the sky meant that it 
was angry. While Le Page du Pratz tried to downplay the situation by explaining the 
science of the sunset, there was no escaping the looming violence that was set to erupt in 
Natchez Country a few years later:   
… this was a phenomenon that announced something sinister for Louisianans. 
And though the massacre of the French establishment at the hands of the Natchez 
would not come until almost four years later, most of those who escaped it, are 
still persuaded that this was a warning of that disaster.
93
 
---------- 
 The founder of Louisiana and its first governor, Pierre le Moyne, Sieur 
D‟Iberville, was born in Canada in 1661, the third of twelve sons, and he became a 
popular military hero in the region while only in his mid-twenties. He and his own 
genealogical squadron of eleven brothers harassed the English throughout their careers, 
first at Hudson Bay and then while commanding a frigate along the New England coast. 
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Because of his rising star (especially in enterprises against the English), D‟Iberville was 
viewed as the model candidate to counter English advances in the lower Mississippi 
River basin around the turn of the century. He led three preliminary expeditions into the 
region and, in 1699, founded Louisiana by establishing Fort Maurepas, the first 
permanent European settlement on the Gulf Coast, near present-day Biloxi, Mississippi. 
After relinquishing governorship of the colony to De Sauvole, D‟Iberville turned his eyes 
to English possessions in the Caribbean, looting St. Kitts and capturing Nevis before 
dying of yellow fever while in Havana in in 1706. 
While D‟Iberville was instrumental in the founding of Louisiana, it was his third-
youngest brother, De Bienville, who played a larger role in the history of Louisiana and, 
more specifically, a larger role in the destruction of the Natchez. De Bienville served 
under D‟Iberville in a naval campaign against the English in the Hudson Bay area around 
1697, and then followed his widely-acclaimed brother to Louisiana, where he gained a 
reputation for his ability to negotiate with, gain the trust of and, if necessary, make war 
upon Indians in the region.
94
 In a 1713 letter to Pontchartrain, Duclos, then the 
commissary general of Louisiana, lauded Bienville‟s ability to win over the natives:  
he would show them great friendship, regale them and very often succeeded by 
this means with the assistance of the of the Indian language which he speaks 
perfectly, for these Indian chiefs delighted to see a French chief caress them and 
have them eat with him … the thing that has also contributed most to make him 
respected and liked by the Indians has been the care that he has taken never to 
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break his word to them, to protect the smallest and the feeblest nations like the 
strongest.
95
 
 Upon leaving Louisiana in 1701, D‟Iberville left De Bienville as second-in-
command to De Sauvole. When De Sauvole died, unexpectedly, from an epidemic that 
plagued the young colony later that year, however, De Bienville, by default, began his 
first of five stints as the governor of Louisiana. Despite his popularity among the local 
Indians and his many diplomatic and military successes in the lower Mississippi River 
basin, De Bienville appeared insecure in the letters he wrote. In nearly all of his 
correspondences with Pontchartrain, De Bienville reserved a paragraph or two, usually 
towards the end, to list his accomplishments, bemoan his wretched health in the colony, 
beg for more supplies, plead for a raise and, sometimes, ask plainly to be awarded the 
Cross of St. Louis. He penned a letter to Pontchartrain in 1711, saying:  
I have been here for 13 years; I have spent my youth here; I have worn out my 
health here and I have not, my lord, certainly made any profit here … if you had 
any kindness for me my lord, I should hope that you would be so good as to do 
me the favor of increasing my salary or of granting me a commission of captain 
… or of lieutenant of a vessel with the Cross of St. Louis.
96
  
This paranoia was founded, though, as the crown seemed to possess an innate 
distrust of De Bienville. To the crown, De Bienvile was the ideal interim governor of 
Louisiana (hence the five, oftentimes short-lived, governorships), the quintessential 
second-in-command / advisor archetype who could oversee the colony and maintain 
amicable relations with the Indians until a less-qualified puppet governor could be 
installed.  It is plausible that this distrust stemmed from serious charges levied against De 
Bienville around 1708 that, essentially, amounted to extortion (De Bienville described the 
allegations as “taking lavishly from the King‟s warehouse and having the goods sold to 
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the inhabitants at exorbitant prices”).
97
 De Bienville, however, surmised that 
Pontchartrain, an aristocrat, simply did not like his late brother, D‟Iberville, a glorified 
pirate, and, as such, refused to advance the careers of De Bienville or his brothers. By 
1717, Pontchartrain had resigned his position and De Bienville took the opportunity to 
publish this conspiracy theory concerning his stagnant career in a letter to the regency 
council:  
My lord de Pontchartrain offended with the late Mr. D‟Iberville, for I know not 
what reason, had resolved to make his wrath descend upon me as if I could have 
answered for the causes for displeasure that Mr. D‟Iberville could have given him. 
In this idea he had determined not to promote me at all or any of my family.  
Then, in patented De Bienville form, he shrewdly asked for a raise:  
I hope that the council in the intention that it has to render justice to everybody 
will be so good as to pay attention to the fact that I am very poorly compensated 
for my services.
98
  
De Bienville‟s most prominent antagonist in Louisiana was Cadillac, who made a 
name for himself at Detroit before replacing a beleaguered De Bienville, then facing 
charges of extortion, as governor of Louisiana in 1710. It was the second, and not the last, 
time De Bienville was replaced as governor by a newcomer to the colony. Sensing, 
correctly, that De Bienville would not welcome the usurper Cadillac to Louisiana with 
open arms, Pontchartrain levied a stern warning to De Bienville. “He [the King] desires 
that you live on good terms with this governor,” Pontchartrain wrote in a letter.
99
 It 
appeared that De Bienville tried, in good faith, to coexist with Cadillac, but the two 
quarreled often. One quarrel, documented in a letter from Cadillac to Pontchartrain, 
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resulted in Cadillac putting De Bienville under house arrest following this blistering 
exchange: 
Mr. De Lamothe: You are an impertinent fellow and I order you to keep silence. 
Mr. De Bienville: I care very little and I am very little embarrassed that you 
should order me to keep silence. 
Mr. De Lamothe: Go away under arrest immediately. 
Mr. De Bienville: Yes, under arrest I shall not go.
100
 
 
Despite De Bienville‟s stupendously confusing final statement in which he appeared to, 
simultaneously, agree and disagree to be put under arrest, Cadillac‟s order was carried 
out and De Bienville was escorted to his house, which, according to a sardonic De 
Bienville, was “so much the better. That will refresh me if I am there long for we are now 
in the hot season.”
101
 
 The house arrest incident, however, was minor in comparison to the dispute that 
took place over one year later, when Cadillac, allegedly without informing De Bienville, 
left the colony and travelled north by canoe to examine a silver mine discovered in 
Illinois country. On his journey to and from Illinois country, Cadillac seemed to insult 
every Indian tribe with which he came into contact: “On the journey that Mr. De Lamothe 
has just made to the Illinois he quarreled as he went up with all the nations that are along 
this river … All the nations are talking about it with very great scorn to the shame of the 
French to the extent of threatening to kill some of them,” De Bienville wrote in a 
scathing, accusatory letter to Pontchartrain in 1716.
102
 In a similar letter written from De 
Bienville to another French superior just weeks later, De Bienville made it clear that of 
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all the tribes Cadillac affronted on his voyage, perhaps the one he affronted the most was 
the Natchez.
103
 
---------- 
The first interactions between the French and the Natchez were positive ones. 
During Robert Cavalier de La Salle‟s famed mission down the Mississippi River in 1682, 
he and his party encountered the Natchez and exchanged a calumet of peace with them. 
In 1700, D‟Iberville, De Bienville and another party of explorers visited the Natchez and 
were given fresh fish by a group of Stinkards on the bank of the river before being 
greeted by the Tattooed Serpent, escorted to the Grand Village and shown boundless 
hospitality.
104
 Father Paul du Ru, the party‟s Black Robe, wrote of their halcyon stay in 
the Grand Village: “We are living with them as with brothers … I should prefer to be 
alone at night in their midst than on Rue St. Jacques in Paris at nine o‟clock in the 
evening.”
105
 
 The early leaders of Louisiana were under strict orders from Louis XIV to seek 
peace with Indians. In a letter to Cadillac, Louis XIV wrote that De Bienville should 
“apply himself carefully to managing all these Indians, to maintain peace among them 
and to conciliate them in their quarrels which they have with each other, in order to put 
himself in control of their commerce and to prevent the English from coming and trading 
among them.”
106
 As Canadians, D‟Iberville and De Bienville understood the importance 
of peaceful Indians to sustain a trade-based colony, and their diplomatic voyage to the 
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Natchez in 1700 was successful, at least in the short term, in generating an ally. However, 
after that initial contact, from 1700 to about 1708, the Natchez are hardly mentioned in 
the French history of Louisiana. 
 One must understand the geopolitical theater of that era to understand why the 
Natchez reemerged. Ironically, a war that was fought mostly in Europe played a large 
role. The War of Spanish Succession, which lasted from 1701-1713, was the result of a 
French Bourbon, Phillipe d‟Anjou, the grandson of French king Louis XIV, ascending to 
the Spanish throne left vacant by an heirless Carlos II. The “Grand Alliance” of England, 
the Netherlands and Austria, sensing that a Spanish-French coalition would upset “the 
balance of power in Europe,” challenged the ascension, and the 12-year conflict was 
ignited.
107
 It did not go well for Spain. The Treaty of Utrecht, which ended the war in 
1713, divided Spain‟s European empire amongst a throng of its chief rivals, and it also 
“weakened Spain‟s position in the Southeast [of North America].”
108
 During the limited 
North American theater of the war, an English officer named James Moore led a 
Sherman-esque march through northern Florida, burning everything in his path, including 
the town of St. Augustine. Moore did not sack Spanish Florida for England, but the 
damage he did – destroying important Spanish missions among the Apalachee Indians 
and forcing Spanish colonists to completely abandon the province – was palpable.
109
 The 
War of Spanish Succession is important because it marked the end of Spain‟s reign as a 
colonial power. Spain retained territory in North America – primarily debilitated, burnt-
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out Florida and other territories off to the west – but it would never again be a major 
player on the continent. 
 Spain‟s loss was France‟s gain. “As England expanded at Spain‟s expense during 
the war, so too, by increasing its presence on the gulf, did its French ally,” writes David J. 
Weber in his book, The Spanish Frontier in North America.
110
 France, admittedly, ceded 
territory to England in the Treaty of Utrecht, most significantly Newfoundland and 
Acadia; however, it gained so much more by watching Spain, the original European 
colonizer of North America, fade into obscurity. Suddenly, by 1713, it was France versus 
England for possession of North America, and France had a lot of catching up to do in 
terms of populating that continent with settlers. 
 To that end, a population boom occurred in New France around 1716, three years 
after the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht. The population of New France, as a whole, 
increased by just 6,533 people (12,431-18,964) in the 22 years between 1692 and 1714. 
In the 23 years between 1716 and 1749, however, its population increased steeply by 
22,170 people (20,531-42,701). Even more telling is the increase in married women that 
came to New France following the War of Spanish Succession, an indication that more 
families were coming with more permanent intentions. In the 26 years between 1688-
1714, the number of married French women in New France increased by just 1,190 
(1,741-2,931). In the 23 years between 1714-1737, however, the number of married 
French women in New France increased by 3,873 (2,931-6,804).
111
 With the influx of 
settlers arriving in New France, and the fur trade suffering from mortal wounds, a new 
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entity became desirable: land, and preferably fertile land that a hard-working French 
family could make its own and, from it, produce profitable cash crops to sell at the 
market. In all of continental New France, the colony with some of the most bountiful land 
was Louisiana. 
  The location of that bountiful land, however, was not readily apparent. Most 
settlers in the early-eighteenth century arrived in Louisiana by boat and became 
disenchanted by the ruinous conditions on the coast. Pierre D‟Artaguette, the colony‟s 
commissary general, wrote to Pontchartrain in 1708, saying: “There is nothing so sad as 
the as the situation of this poor colony. Every day we discover plots that are being formed 
to desert among the sailors and the soldiers.”
112
 Colonists languished in steamy, swampy 
conditions. Soldiers wore buckskins instead of uniforms. The colony‟s warehouses sat 
barren. All of this, according to D‟Artaguette, gave “the Indians a miserable idea” of the 
French.
113
 Tivas de Gourville, a French officer in the Louisiana, opined that the colonists‟ 
sexual dalliances with the local Indians stunted the development of the colony. In a 1712 
letter to Pontchartrain, he wrote: “the hunters and the backwoodsmen who are of a strong 
and vigorous age and temperament and who like the sex … are wanderers among the 
Indian nations and satisfy their passions with the daughters of these Indians, which 
retards the growth of this colony.”
114
 Cadillac, meanwhile, blamed refugee Canadians in 
Louisiana, citing their natural inclination towards vice and laziness: “According to the 
proverb „Bad country, bad people‟ one can say that they are a heap of the dregs of 
Canada, jailbirds without subordination for religion and for government,” Cadillac wrote 
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in a 1713 letter to Pontchartrain, bemoaning the condition of the colony of which he had 
recently become governor.
115
 Everyone, it seems, had far-ranging opinions on the root of 
Louisiana‟s poor state during the first 20 years of its existence; however, everyone agreed 
it was, indeed, a poor state.  Colonists received rations of flour, but not meat. Disease was 
rampant. Louisiana was, according to Cadillac, “a monster.”
116
 
  In Louisiana, colonists complained about the lack of resources from France, the 
violent squalls (which were, presumably, hurricanes) and the dearth of animals with 
which to plow. But, mostly, colonists complained about the poor quality of the land. The 
soil was marshy, and even in areas where colonists were able to grow wheat, the wheat 
was usually wiped out by heavy fog. D‟Artaguette described the situation in a 1710 letter 
to Pontchartrain: “Some fogs came up that made [the wheat] completely wither away in 
such a way that it will be all that one can do to gather six [bushels] where there was 
prospect of getting more than one hundred.” In that same letter, D‟Artaguette said that 
colonists were convinced that it was impossible to grow wheat as far south as Louisiana, 
“and they have asked me for concessions at the Natchez, an Indian village sixty leagues 
from the settlement of Biloxi.”
117
 While it was not the first mention of the Natchez, or the 
first allusion to the desirability of Natchez lands, it was the first insinuation of a need to 
act on the desirability of Natchez lands. With Louisiana in shambles, reeling from the 
effects of a dreadful location that was conducive to disease and hostile to farming or 
producing any goods with which to trade the local Indians, colonists were growing 
restless. Even D‟Artaguette, who devoted most of the content in his letters to the idea of 
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improving – not running from – France‟s lot at the mouth of the Mississippi River, 
seemed intrigued by the idea of testing French fortunes at the Natchez: “As far as 
transportation is concerned it will always be very easy,” he wrote to Pontchartrain, in a 
transparent attempt to convince himself. “It is necessary only to descend the 
Mississippi.”
118
 Although it was only mentioned in passing in 1710, the colonists‟ request 
for concessions at the Natchez foreshadowed France‟s next move. It was only a matter of 
time before the French went north to the bluffs.  
While private land concessions were not immediately granted at the Natchez, a 
French trading post was built near the Grand Village three years later. The establishment 
of the trading post, which was actually nothing more than a small shop and a warehouse, 
coincided with the arrival of Cadillac in Louisiana. Cadillac possessed no tangible 
experience in the lower Mississippi River basin, but he had swindled Indians in Canada 
for nearly 30 years, and he was hand-picked by Pontchartrain to govern Louisiana and 
transform the depleted, miserable afterthought into a thriving, profitable colony.  
One of Cadillac‟s original designs for Louisiana was exploiting mines along the 
Mississippi River.
119
 In 1714, just one year after arriving in Louisiana, he travelled 
upriver to inspect one of these mines, and the voyage – not the inspection of the mine – 
impacted the fortunes of the colony forever. On his way north, Cadillac passed by all the 
Indian tribes along the river without exchanging gifts or smoking the calumet. This was 
not well-received, so Cadillac promised that he would perform the ritualistic pleasantries 
expected of him on his return trip. On his way south, however, Cadillac passed by all the 
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Indian tribes along the river without exchanging gifts or smoking the calumet. This was 
even less well-received. Or, as De Bienville eloquently conveyed it to Pontchartrain in a 
letter: “That made a very bad impression.”
120
 
The specifics of the calumet ceremony varied among Indian tribes; however, the 
ceremony almost uniformly featured a long-stemmed pipe that members of different 
groups smoked to signify the establishment of a “fictive kinship relationship.”
121
 It was 
an extremely important ritual to many tribes along the Mississippi River. In fact, 
according to Ian W. Brown, “Few material items in historic times have had such singular 
cultural significance as the calumet.”
122
 Thus, in his book The Natchez Indians: A History 
to 1735, James Barnett ponders how, and why, Cadillac could have allowed this offense 
to occur: “Given [Cadillac‟s] long experience with Indians in the Great Lakes area, it is 
hard to imagine why he would have behaved so imprudently.”
123
 The imprudent 
behavior, however, might have been intentional – a deliberate attempt by Cadillac to 
incite the Natchez into an absolute, tribal-decimating war from which there was no 
escape.   
Because of their remote location to the north, the incensed Natchez would not 
have caused significant alarm in Mobile, which sat near the mouth of the Mississippi 
River. However, a French trading post existed miles from the Grand Village, and that 
trading post was vital in keeping the Natchez, in good commercial standing with the 
French and bad commercial standing with the English. So, when the two Frenchmen who 
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operated the trading post at the Natchez, Marc-Antoine de La Loire des Ursins and Louis-
Auguste de La Loire Flaucort, narrowly escaped ambush and fled to Mobile with news 
that the Natchez had looted the trading post and murdered four French Coureur des bois 
in 1716, Cadillac dispatched De Bienville to silence the unrest and protect the trading 
post. Then, once those defensive, retributive theatrics were done, De Bienville had orders 
to go on the offensive and establish an even larger French presence in the region by 
erecting a fort, Fort Rosalie. Before he left, a reluctant De Bienville penned a cryptic 
letter to one of his superiors in France:  
These Natchez … have always intended to kill Frenchmen since the time that 
[Cadillac] passed by their county … and refused to accept the calumet of peace 
that they wished to sing to him … [Cadillac] on this occasion wished to save a 
little merchandise that will perhaps cost us very dearly. The Natchez have 
pillaged merchandise to the value of eight to ten thousand livres … there is 
ground for inferring that this nation has not done a thing of this sort without 
having clearly foreseen that they would quarrel with us in such a way that they 
could not hope for any pardon without a good satisfaction. This makes me believe 
that we shall be obliged to make war on them.
124
 
In April of 1716, De Bienville and an army of 34 soldiers set out north towards 
the Natchez. It was a laughable number of men, especially considering two-thirds of 
them, according to De Bienville, were “ill, and without provisions,” and they were about 
to square off against a bristling tribe of about 800 warriors.
125
 The garrison at Mobile 
consisted of 150 soldiers, and De Bienville hoped he would, at least, be able to command 
80 of them on such an important mission. However, Cadillac, the man who had brazenly 
instigated the affair, granted him only 34.
126
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Undaunted, De Bienville used cunning in the place of numbers. He could not 
attack with 34 men. He might as well have removed his own scalp and presented it to the 
Natchez. Instead, he and his men hunkered down on an island near the west bank of the 
Mississippi River and sent word to the Grand Village that they wished to meet with the 
chiefs. When eight Natchez chiefs arrived – among them, the Great Sun and the Tattooed 
Serpent – De Bienville and his men forcibly apprehended them as hostages. Using the 
chiefs as leverage, De Bienville laid out his demands, and watched as they were all 
carried out. Two of the three Indians who had murdered the Coureur des bois were 
beheaded (the third Indian could not be found, so his brother was executed instead), all of 
the merchandise and livestock that had been pillaged from the trading post was returned 
and, in what might have been De Bienville‟s finest achievement as a human, the Natchez 
began building Fort Rosalie for the French.
127
 Days later, De Bienville and his men also 
secretly executed The Bearded and Alahoflechia, two of the eight hostage chiefs 
considered to be leaders of the pro-English faction in the tribe and thought to have 
ordered the murders of the Coureur des bois.
128
 
It was a stunning victory for a man who, simply, was not supposed to succeed. De 
Bienville was a thorn in Cadillac‟s side, and it is not difficult to imagine Cadillac sending 
De Bienville to the Natchez with 34 men hoping he would, for lack of a more 
sophisticated term, die. In a letter to Ponchartrain, Duclos wondered why else Cadillac 
would order such a lopsided expedition: “[De Bienville] ought at that time to have been 
given the number of men and of Indians that he needed to succeed … or he ought not to 
have been sent; otherwise it is to order him to do a thing and at the same time refuse him 
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the means of executing it. It is consequently a useless enterprise and useless 
expenditures.”
129
   Yet, despite his inadequate force, De Bienville had not only eliminated 
two main components of the pro-English faction in the tribe and acquired means to 
construct Fort Rosalie, he had established peace. Peace was “a very necessary matter,” 
according to Duclos, because it allowed Fort Rosalie, the next logical step in France‟s 
slow encroachment on the fertile Natchez bluffs, to be built, and it enabled open travel 
and trade on the Mississippi River again. Cadillac understood that peace with the 
Natchez, at least at that time, was ideal. However, because De Bienville had delivered 
that peace, Cadillac, in vintage Cadillac form, would not admit it. “[Cadillac] sees as 
clearly as anyone the soundness,” Duclos wrote in a letter to Pontchartrain. “… But the 
fact that Mr. De Bienville [who is] perfectly acquainted with the manner of governing the 
Indians is of an opinion is enough for him to not share it.”
130
 
De Bienville‟s victory in the First Natchez War – as the hostage situation on the 
small island in the Mississippi River generously became known – was the final blow to 
Cadillac‟s incessantly-disgruntled governorship. Cadillac‟s plans to renovate Louisiana 
into a well-populated, profitable colony seemed to be constantly curtailed by his 
quarrelsome rivalry with De Bienville, and in 1716, he was “recalled.”
131
 Cadillac‟s 
financiers went down with him. Pontchartrain, who it was rumored only lasted as long as 
he did on the French court because of his “ability to entertain the king with amusing 
gossip,”
132
 resigned a year earlier following King Louis XIV‟s death in 1715, and 
Antoine Crozat, the king‟s financial secretary who held the Louisiana monopoly, 
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relinquished control of his monopoly to John Law‟s Company of the West in 1717. This 
chain of events, according to Barnett, set “in motion France‟s last enthusiastic push to 
colonize the Lower Mississippi Valley.”
133
 
Law changed everything for the Natchez. Cadillac recognized the need to exploit 
the Natchez‟s land in order to transform the Louisiana colony, but he was under-qualified 
and ill-prepared to do so. Law was neither. A radical Scottish banker, Law fell into favor 
in the French court following the king‟s death, and he used his considerable financial 
sway to gain control of the commercial monopoly of Canada and Louisiana in 1717. 
Behind Law‟s financing, French settlers began pouring into Louisiana with the intent to 
finally colonize – not just trade furs – at a rate that challenged England‟s possession of 
the American south. Law‟s Company of the West – which was renamed the Company of 
the Indies in 1718 – adopted the English model of implementing an aggressive 
advertising campaign to entice settlers to North America, and, according to Barnett, the 
company hyped Louisiana as “an agricultural El Dorado where, among other things, 
Indians would be clamoring to farm silkworms in the native mulberry trees.”
134
 Once 
these bright-eyed entrepreneurs reached Mobile or New Orleans, which was founded in 
1718 and became the capital of Louisiana in 1722, it is not difficult to imagine where 
they were told this “agricultural El Dorado” existed: upriver at the Natchez bluffs. 
Le Page du Pratz was one such bright-eyed entrepreneur. Le Page du Pratz, whose 
detailed accounts are increasingly important from this point forward, reached Fort 
Rosalie in 1720 bearing two large concessions from New Orleans. The location of New 
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Orleans in relation to Fort Rosalie and the Natchez bluffs can be seen below in Figure 2. 
The Dutchman‟s arrival was indicative of the wave of French settlers that invaded 
Natchez lands and unsettled French and Natchez relations over the bloody decade that 
ensued. The frequency at which the settlers came and the proximity at which they settled 
from the Natchez greatly contributed to the outbreaks of the Second and Third Natchez 
Wars.  
The Second Natchez War ignited when a band of Natchez attacked a Frenchman 
named M. de Guenot in 1722. Guenot was the overseer of the St. Catherine concession – 
one of the largest French farms in the area – and he was unpopular amongst the Natchez 
of the White Apple village (a decidedly pro-English village) for, allegedly, putting “an 
Honored Man of [that] village in chains even before there was any quarrel between the  
 
Figure 2. Map of French Louisiana, 1720 
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French and the Indians.”
135
 The Natchez responded by shooting at Guenot, slaughtering 
some livestock at the St. Catherine concession and, generally, creating a nuisance.  
In New Orleans, word of the meager uprising was met with a level of anger that 
seemed to outweigh the circumstances, as if the French were looking for a reason to 
remove the Natchez.  De Bienville noted that it was important to preserve “a very 
abundant crop of tobacco, rice and other provisions” at the Natchez by gathering 
“together a number of Frenchmen and Indians from our small nations to go and exact 
vengeance for these insults and to destroy the trouble-makers.”
136
 Sieur Fleuriau, the 
young, passionate attorney-general of Louisiana, fumed that “these barbarians are not 
won by presents at all. They must have examples that will make them tremble and 
exterminate as many of them as possible … it is now only a question of considering 
whether it can be done.”
137
 The answer to Fleuriau‟s question was that it could not be 
done, at least not then.  
De Bienville fell sick with a near-fatal fever one month after the uprising, writing 
that he was on the “brink of death” and noting that a priest was brought in to administer 
him the last sacrament.
138
 Because of the sickness, and a general lack of provisions in the 
colony at that time, De Bienville never set foot at the Natchez during the Second Natchez 
War. The hero of the Second Natchez War was the Tattooed Serpent, who diffused the 
volatile situation by serving as a liaison between the St. Catherine concession and the 
White Apple village and, eventually, negotiating a peace.
139
 In the end, the Second 
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Natchez War was so minor that it ended with Sieur Payton, one of De Bienville‟s 
lieutenants, sailing up from New Orleans and demanding reimbursement from the 
Natchez in the forms of chickens. Eager to maintain peace with the French, the Natchez 
gathered “a certain number of fowls” and delivered them to Payton, who, in turn, sailed 
them back to New Orleans.
140
  
The Third Natchez War, like the Second Natchez War, was born of vague 
circumstances. Le Page du Pratz insisted that the French strike on the Natchez in the fall 
of 1723 was unprovoked, but that seems unlikely. Jean-Francois Benjamin de Dumont, a 
French officer in Louisiana, wrote that the Third Natchez War started when a rogue band 
of Natchez, perhaps still bristling from the events of 1722, slaughtered more livestock at 
the St. Catherine concession.
141
 Whatever the cause, De Bienville, by then fully 
recovered from his illness, went on the offensive. De la Chaise, the colony‟s commissary 
general, wrote that in late September of 1723, De Bienville “left New Orleans … to go to 
the Natchez for the war against the Indians. He gathered together as many Canadians and 
Indians from the country round about as he could.”
142
 
The Third Natchez War, unlike the Second Natchez War, brought substantial 
action, but it was almost completely one-sided. The events of 1723 were more of a 
massacre than a war, as De Bienville, behind a force that Le Page du Pratz estimated at 
700 men, swept through the White Apple village district, burning houses, scalping males 
and abducting – read, enslaving – women that were fit to work.
143
 Barnett called it a 
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“scorched-earth campaign.”
144
 De Bienville, who was apparently blinded by rage over the 
killing of some cows and goats, even threatened to attack the pro-French Grand Village, 
but, again, the Tattooed Serpent played the role of mediator and talked the commander 
down. When the smoke, literally, cleared, the French marauders had wiped out the Grigra 
settlement, which was located near the White Apple village, and forced the execution of 
Old Hair, the chief of the White Apple Village. The remaining fugitive Indians from the 
White Apple and Jenzenaque villages fled “to inaccessible country,” and the French did 
not pursue them.
145
 In January of 1724, the French Council of War ended the Third 
Natchez War by granting peace to the Natchez, saying: “The Council of War has judged 
it necessary for the safety of the French to grant peace to these Indians, so much the more 
because there is reason to fear that these fugitives may make raids upon the remote 
plantations and upon the Frenchmen who ascend or descend the river …”
146
 
The Second and Third Natchez Wars were triggered by seemingly menial affronts 
such as the unprovoked shackling of a White Apple chief and the slaughter of farm 
animals at the St. Catherine concession, but the overlying cause of both conflicts was 
proximity. Ever since early reports described the Natchez as a North American Eden, the 
French had designs on the lush bluffs nestled along the Mississippi River. By 1720, 
French settlers – spurred by the aggressive marketing campaign of John Law‟s Company 
of the Indies – had begun their encroachment, and at an alarming rate. The French had 
interacted with Indians for nearly two centuries in North America, but their interactions 
were almost always limited to the arena of trade. At the Natchez, interactions were 
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residential. The French built large plantations at the Natchez to take advantage of the 
agricultural opportunities in the area, and the proximity at which they built the plantations 
to Natchez villages – as well as the degree at which they intermingled, in both business 
and pleasure, with their Indian neighbors – was unprecedented. Due to their remote 
location, far to the north of the port at New Orleans, French settlers near Fort Rosalie 
maintained a somewhat unhealthy reliance on the Natchez for supplies, and, according to 
Le Page du Pratz, French men often carried on illicit relationships with Natchez women. 
Le Page du Pratz wrote: “In the space of sixteen years that I resided in Louisiana, I 
remarked, that the war, and even the bare disputes we have had with [the Natchez], never 
had any other origin, but our too familiar intercourse with them.”
147
 Because of this “too 
familiar intercourse,” the once-congenial relationship between the French and the 
Natchez, as evidenced by the Second and Third Natchez Wars, soured over the third 
decade of the eighteenth century. 
Two events served to sour the relationship even further: the construction of a 
tobacco factory at the Natchez and the death of the Tattooed Serpent, both of which 
occurred in 1725. The French wanted to cultivate tobacco at the Natchez at a rate 
comparable to the English in Virginia and the Carolinas, but they encountered numerous 
problems. The primary problems were storing the tobacco and transporting the tobacco 
back to New Orleans.
148
 “To ward off all of these disadvantages,” a committee wrote to 
the directors of the Company of the Indies in November of 1724. “The Committee has 
found only one expedient which is that of establishing a tobacco factory at the Natchez, 
of having a part of it put it on rolls and of having another part pressed after having had it 
                                                          
147
 Le Page du Pratz, 96. 
148
 Memoir on Tobacco at Natchez, October 1724, Vol. II, 396.  
58 
 
stemmed and having put a flavor in it.”
149
 The company-owned factory was completed in 
the spring of 1725, and it revolutionized the way tobacco was produced at the Natchez, 
making it easier, and more cost-efficient, for settlers to grow the lucrative crop. That, in 
turn, made the Natchez a more attractive location for entrepreneurs and concessionaires 
looking to make a profit, even at the expense of the local Indians. According to Barnett, 
the French population at the Natchez doubled from 200 people to 400 people from 1726 
to 1729, and the number of African slaves increased to 286 during that same time span.
150
 
The Tattooed Serpent died in the summer of 1725. His death came at an 
inopportune time, as both the French and the Natchez would have benefited from his 
mediation during the French population boom that occurred in the years following the 
construction of the tobacco factory. Barnett wrote of the Tattooed Serpent: “[he] was 
considered to be the tribe‟s „war chief,‟ but all of his documented activities were in the 
role of peacemaker. At every conflict between the Natchez and the French, he was front 
and center, negotiating to restore friendship between his people and the foreigners who 
occupied his country.”
151
 Yet, before his death, as settlers poured into Natchez country to 
profit from its tobacco-inducing soil, even the Tattooed Serpent, that reliable old 
advocate of all things French in the lower Mississippi River valley, seemed jaded, and 
leery of what the future held for the two very-different nations that now occupied the 
Natchez bluffs. In a compelling, and cryptic, soliloquy to Le Page du Pratz a year before 
his death, the Tattooed Serpent said:  
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Why did the French come into our country? We did not go to seek them: they 
asked for land of us, because their country was too little for all the men that were 
in it. We told them they might take land where they pleased, there was enough for 
them and for us; that it was good the same sun should enlighten us both and that 
we would walk as friends in the same path; and that we would give them our 
provisions, assist them to build and to labour in their fields. We have done so; is 
not this true? What occasion then had we for Frenchmen? Before they came, did 
we not live better than we do … in fine, before the arrival of the French, we lived 
like men who could be satisfied with what they have; whereas at this day we are 
like slaves.
152
  
Five years later, the Natchez, who the Tattooed Serpent called slaves to the French, 
finally broke free. 
 The Natchez Revolt erupted in 1729, a time when the Natchez colony “was on the 
verge of prosperity.”
153
Trouble originated from a toxic combination of poor French 
leadership at Fort Rosalie and bottled Natchez anger, still fermenting six years after De 
Bienville‟s fiery romp through the bluffs.  
With the French tobacco industry thriving in the fall of 1729, the ranking officer 
at Fort Rosalie, Commandant Chepart, decided he wanted a stake in the profit that 
everyone around him was enjoying. Unfortunately for all involved except him, Chepart‟s 
desired location for erecting his plantation was the White Apple Village, home to the 
same sect of decidedly pro-English Natchez that De Bienville had torched six years 
earlier. Upon summoning the White Apple Sun to Fort Rosalie, Chepart put forth his 
demands that the White Apple Natchez depart their ancestral home of hundreds of years 
so that he could build a tobacco plantation there. Le Page Du Pratz wrote that “The 
Commandant doubtless imagined himself to be speaking to a slave whom one commands 
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in an absolute tone. But he ignored the fact that the Naturals of Louisiana are such 
enemies of slavery that they would prefer death.”
154
 
The White Apple Sun took Chepart‟s provocative demands back to his village and 
used them to rally his people. According to Le Page Du Pratz, who was in New Orleans 
at the time of the revolt and probably based his writings on hearsay, one of the White 
Apple elders said at an assembly: “We have for a long time been aware that the 
neighborliness of the French does us more harm than good … What are we waiting for? 
Do we want to let the French multiply until we are no longer in a position to oppose their 
efforts?”
155
 
On November 28, 1729, with their courage fortified by the inadequate garrison at 
Fort Rosalie – Barnett estimated it at 30 men, most of whom lived among the Natchez 
and not at the fort – and the knowledge that De Bienville was no longer in Louisiana
156
, 
the Natchez executed a deftly-synchronized attack on the French living amongst them. 
Natchez warriors stormed Fort Rosalie, as well as the plantations Fort Rosalie was 
supposed to protect. Very few were spared. French men, women and children were 
hacked to pieces by people who, just the day before, had been their neighbors, and maybe 
even their friends. French men were “scalped and beheaded,”
157
 their bodies left “to the 
dogs, the buzzards, and other carnivorous birds.”
158
 Le Page Du Pratz refused, simply, to 
describe the events of that day, saying: “I draw the curtain across the other parts of this 
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scene; for what one is about to see is simply too horrific.” In all, nearly 200 French were 
slain during the massacre. A handful escaped. Two men, a carter and a tailor, were spared 
by the Natchez. The tailor was forced to fit the Natchez in their new French clothes, and 
the carter was forced to use his team of oxen to clear the French houses of furniture and 
belongings before the jubilant Indians set the houses ablaze in celebration. According to 
Barnett, “blood vengeance for the 1716 and 1723 executions had finally been discharged 
– with interest.”
159
 
The revelry of the Natchez, however, did not last long. To proactively quell the 
very real fear of a coordinated Indian uprising that permeated the colony following the 
massacre, Louisiana‟s governor, Etienne de Perier, sent a joint force of French and 
Choctaw Indians to the bluffs to engage the Natchez in January of 1730. The Choctaw 
got there first and killed nearly 100 Natchez, before the surviving Natchez fell back into a 
pair of forts that were constructed in preparation for the inevitable counterstrike.
160
 The 
siege was on. 
The Natchez, though, withstood the French and Choctaw siege, enduring hunger 
and cannon fire for nearly a month. Then, on the night of February 26, the remaining 
Natchez – estimated at about 200 men, women and children – made a break for it, 
slipping out of the two forts and absconding into the surrounding wilderness without 
being detected. Confounded by the moonlight exodus, Le Page du Pratz wrote: “Thinking 
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about this escape, I cannot see how it was possible … Frankly, I will say that I know 
nothing; I simply know from what I have been told that they became invisible.”
161
 
The escape spelled trouble for the French and their allies in the region. A large 
band of uprooted and angry Natchez now roamed the area, seeking to do menace. In one 
instance, a group of Natchez ambushed and killed 19 Frenchmen who were attempting to 
rebuild the burnt-out Fort Rosalie. In another instance, six Natchez passed themselves off 
as Choctaws, entered the newly-renovated Fort Rosalie and slew five Frenchmen before 
being subdued. Finally, after a Natchez woman was abducted by a group of French-allied 
Tunica Indians, taken to New Orleans and killed “inch by inch” in the square frame, the 
Natchez attacked the Tunicas and very nearly wiped them out.
162
 On the Natchez 
implementing a guerilla – almost terroristic – campaign of warfare throughout the bluffs, 
Le Page du Pratz wrote: “Hey, what is an enemy not capable of when in desperation, 
chased from his land and not knowing where to go!”
163
 
In January of 1731, Perier, himself, led an expedition against the Natchez, chasing 
the rogue tribe far to the northwest of the bluffs, along a small tributary called the Black 
River. The Natchez, again, found protection in a makeshift fort, and after several days of 
siege, nearly 500 of them – primarily women and children – surrendered.
164
 Perier touted 
his mission as a total victory, but, in reality, several Natchez warriors had, to borrow Le 
Page du Pratz‟s phrase, gone invisible and escaped the fort during a driving rainstorm one 
night. These warriors and their families dispersed themselves among the few friendly 
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tribes left in the region, many finding solace with the pro-English Chickasaws, who were 
then warring against the French. The Natchez who surrendered to Perier at the fort were 
jailed in New Orleans, before being shipped off to Santo Domingo to work as slaves. 
Fittingly, the end of the Natchez involved De Bienville. The famous French-
Canadian barnyard animal avenger was summoned back to Louisiana in 1733, two years 
after the French crown regained control of the colony from the Company of the Indies. 
De Bienville arrived in Louisiana with orders to battle the Chickasaws, who had become 
one of the most feared fighting forces in the region, and in doing so he also battled what 
remained of the Natchez.
165
 “After the Chickasaw Wars,” Barnett wrote, “few Natchez 
Indians remained in the Lower Mississippi Valley.”
166
 
---------- 
The question must be asked: why the Natchez? The answer starts with France‟s 
burgeoning rivalry with England. France and England had long been rivals, but it was not 
until the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, when Spain‟s power in North America was 
neutralized, that it became, essentially, a head-to-head showdown for the continent. The 
stakes were suddenly raised between the long-time foes. That heightened rivalry is 
evidenced by a sense of English paranoia permeating through French correspondences 
coming out of Louisiana in the early 1700s. “The English of Carolina are sparing nothing 
to attract all our Indian allies to them,” Bienville wrote desperately to Pontchartrain in a 
1708 letter, before describing in detail the infiltration of Louisiana by English agents bent 
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on subversive meddling among France‟s allied Indians.
167
 In another letter from 1708, De 
Bienville, through a Mr. Robert, requested that black slaves from French-held Caribbean 
islands be sent to Louisiana because “The English colonists of Carolina and Pennsylvania 
derive great benefit from the service of the negroes and that it is by means of them that 
they cultivate their lands and that they make large and rich plantations there.”
168
 The 
paranoia continued into the 1720s. In 1721, the French built a large warehouse near 
Choctaw villages to streamline trade with that tribe because it was feared English traders 
were beginning to make contact.
169
 Then, in 1725, the French constructed a tobacco 
factory in Natchez country, and numerous concessions were granted to French colonists 
near the tobacco factory. As Barnett pointed out, these concessions were also English-
inspired: “they mostly focused their energies on tobacco and were under pressure to 
produce a product comparable to the tobacco coming from Virginia, which the French 
public seemed to prefer.”
170
 
So it was that the floundering Louisiana colony, in an attempt to thwart English 
monopolization of the cash crop market in the south, expanded north to the bluffs of 
Natchez country. The Natchez bluffs were known throughout the region for their fertility, 
and they were written about extensively by French travelers during the era. In 1726, on 
the cusp of the population boom at the Natchez, a French priest traveling down the 
Mississippi River named Father Raphael wrote of the bluffs: “The good quality of the 
land and the ease of clearing it together with the purity of the air are already attracting 
and will in the future attract many settlers to it who will be in a position to make prompt 
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returns to the Company …”
171
 Father Raphael was right. The good quality of the land, 
and the prospect of cultivating lucrative cash crops such as tobacco, cotton and indigo 
from that land, enticed French settlers to Natchez country. There was a problem, 
however. The Natchez already lived on the land, had lived on the land for hundreds of 
years and were currently farming the best it had to offer.  
That conundrum created a scenario that was fairly unique to the history of New 
France: French settlers living among Indians, with intentions to farm on a large scale. For 
years, French settlers had lived around Indians in the Upper Country. “They had been 
bred up together like Children,” an English agent observed.
172
 White noted that the 
French and Indians in the Upper Country had, for the most part, “established a world of 
common meaning.”
173
 However, it was a world that revolved around trade. French 
settlers in the Great Lakes region traded with Indians for a living, and vice versa. If the 
French needed game or fish, they traded with neighboring Indians. If neighboring Indians 
needed muskets, they traded with the French. This trade-based alliance made it so that the 
French did not have to ferociously exploit the Indians‟ natural resources, and it kept 
relations amiable. White wrote of the situation: “The French failure to farm extensively 
outside of the Illinois country had been a cause of chronic complaint for French colonial 
officials, but the limits of their fields meant they did not threaten neighboring Indians.”
174
 
That was not the case at the Natchez, where French plantations and a tobacco 
factory did threaten the neighboring Indians. Even worse, the plantations were farmed by 
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French settlers with no connection to the Indians upon whom they were imposing. In the 
Upper Country, the French and Indians depended on each other for trade goods: food, 
furs, weapons, etc. Because of this reliance, the two sides learned about each other and, in 
some instances, came to respect each other. The French learned the importance of 
smoking the calumet and exchanging gifts with Indians, and, according to an English 
officer in the Upper Country, they “adopted the very Principles and Ideas of the Indians 
and differ from them only a Little in color.”
175
 This reliance did not exist at the Natchez 
and, therefore, neither did the respect. Some trade went on between the French and the 
Natchez, but, for the most part, the French survived and made a living off the crops that 
they grew. The Natchez were just there. In the way.   
In no way was the French settlers‟ lack of respect for Natchez culture more 
evident than in situations concerning the calumet. Barnett described the calumet 
ceremony as “a way for two strangers to establish a fictive kinship as a basis for further 
negotiations.” However, Duclos indicated that the calumet was even more serious than 
that. In a 1716 letter to Pontchartrain, Duclos wrote: “Calumets are a sign of peace and it 
is custom among the Indians not to refuse them from any nation except those upon which 
they absolutely wish to make war.”
176
 Therefore, when Cadillac refused the Natchez 
calumet on his voyage up the Mississippi River in 1714, it was an act of war and forever 
altered the relationship between the Natchez and French. De Bienville, Duclos and others 
in Louisiana wrote off Cadillac‟s refusal as a blunder; however, perhaps it was a message 
instead. Cadillac was new to Louisiana, but he was not new to North America. He had 
spent several years interacting with Indians around Detroit. He understood the 
                                                          
175
 White, 316. 
176
 Duclos to Pontchartrain, 7 June 1716, Vol. III, 208. 
67 
 
significance of the calumet. By refusing it, perhaps Cadillac was communicating to the 
Natchez that, unlike in the Upper Country, the French would not clamor to maintain 
peace with them. The French did not need peace with the Natchez to facilitate an all-
important fur trade in Louisiana. The French needed the land on which the Natchez lived, 
and it is very possible Cadillac was inciting the Natchez to war to obtain that very land. 
The answer to the question “why the Natchez?” ends with land. Land was at the 
heart of the Natchez annihilation. French settlers had lived in close proximity with 
Indians before; however, the proximity at which French settlers lived to Indians at the 
Natchez was different. In the Upper Country, French and Indians were trade partners. In 
Louisiana, and especially at the Natchez, French and Indians were land rivals. The French 
were invading Natchez land, and the Natchez were hindering French opportunities to 
grow tobacco comparable to the English tobacco coming out of Virginia. Woods 
described the situation:  
When the land became the private property of individuals, as it did at the Natchez 
post, when the company decided to exploit its tobacco plantation, the Indians 
were squeezed out. On realizing that the French no longer intended to share the 
land, but rather, to take it all, and that tribe now faced removal, the Natchez struck 
back violently.
177
 
Unfortunately for the Natchez, the French struck back even more violently. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 The most significant link between the Fox Wars and the Natchez Wars was 
Antoine de Lamothe Cadillac. The pragmatic, conniving Frenchman was a major player 
in both affairs, and his actions embodied France‟s situational policies in the New World.  
Detroit, Cadillac‟s Upper Country brainchild, was, according to a letter to 
Pontchartrain, established as a means of “holding the Iroquois in check; and of 
maintaining our Allies in their duty,” making it “ … much easier to Frenchify the latter 
and to preach the Gospel to them, on account of the proximity of the French and the 
number of Missionaries who will be there.”
178
 “Frenchify” is the key word in the letter. 
Aside, of course, from it not being a legitimate word, “Frenchify” suggested no malice. It 
was not Cadillac‟s intentions to gather together all of the western Great Lakes tribes at 
Detroit so that it would be easier to systematically destroy them. It was Cadillac‟s goal to 
“Frenchify” the western Great Lakes tribes. “Frenchify” also suggested no desire to turn 
all of the Indians at Detroit into French citizens. Most likely, “Frenchify” suggested a 
desire to make those Indians French allies, or, more specifically, strengthen the alliances 
that were already in place through Christian conversion and sheer immediacy. The tribes 
invited to live near Detroit were already friends of the French, but Detroit allowed 
Cadillac to more strongly regulate their activities, and it allowed missionaries – those 
dual agents of salvation and manipulation – to promote alliance and a pro-French agenda 
amongst their followers.  
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In the Upper Country, alliances were worth more than land, and Cadillac knew 
that. A strong alliance system allowed the French to keep peace with neighboring Indians 
and among neighboring Indians, and peace was the driving force behind the all-important 
fur trade in the region. “It is certain that you have nothing so important in the present 
state of affairs as the maintenance of peace with the Iroquois and other Indian nations,” 
Pontchartrain wrote to Vaudreuil in a 1706 correspondence, illustrating the crown‟s 
desire for harmony in the Great Lakes region.
179
 Vaudreuil responded to Pontchartrain: “I 
am persuaded, My Lord … that the tranquility of this Colony depends on the peace with 
these Indians.”
180
 According to Rushforth, the French crown even began to subsidize the 
fur trade – “essentially paying traders to sell at a loss” – in order to procure Indian 
alliances.
181
 
To that end, Cadillac developed a “mastery of Indian diplomacy,” according to 
White, and he displayed that mastery quite often.
182
 In 1695, when he was still the 
commander at Michilimackinac, Cadillac convened with a Huron chief called the Baron, 
who was trying to convince Cadillac to halt war parties sent against his tribe by Cadillac 
because the Huron had been flirting, commercially, with the English and the Iroquois. 
The Baron attempted to bribe Cadillac with gifts, primarily beaver pelts. “Cadillac, 
appearing in an Indian council, followed Algonquin forms and, knowing what acceptance 
of the gift signified, refused it … He rejected an Indian device through his own use of 
                                                          
179
 Letter of Count de Pontchartrain to Governor de Vaudreuil, 9 June 1706, Wisconsin Historical 
Collections,228. 
180
 Part of a letter from Governor de Vaudreuil to Count de Pontchartrain, 4 November 1706, Wisconsin 
Historical Collections, 240. 
181
 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 142. 
182
 White, 56. 
70 
 
Algonquin-Iroquoian diplomatic forms.”
183
 Cadillac also used his familiarity with Indian 
culture and ceremonies to convince large numbers of tribes to migrate to the area around 
Detroit in the early 1700s. In a 1703 letter, Marest, who was tasked by Cadillac to recruit 
Indians to Detroit, regretfully reported that the Huron “would never go to Detroit; such 
was their final resolution.” However, in a footnote found at the conclusion of the letter, 
Cadillac, himself, added that a group of about 30 Huron had recently agreed to live at 
Detroit and that if he “be left to act according to the customs of the Savages – that is, 
through presents and collars – he will bring them all to Detroit.”
184
  Then, after gathering 
a variety of Indians at his “Paris of America,” Cadillac delicately preserved the alliance 
between the French and the Ottawa by wryly applying Algonquin cultural logic in the 
judicial matter of an Ottawa chief, Le Pesant, whose band had murdered five Miami 
chiefs in 1706 and, in doing so, nearly caused all of Detroit to erupt in violence.
185
 
Cadillac was not a man of buckskins, living among the Indians of the Upper 
Country. He was no Coureur des bois. He was a cunning politician. However, he was a 
cunning politician who understood the customs of the Indians of western New France, 
and he used that understanding to advance the interests of his country. France wanted 
peace with and among the Indians of the Great Lakes, because such a peace generated fur 
trade profit. So, Cadillac smoked calumets, exchanged gifts and negotiated shrewd peace 
treaties to preserve the alliance and keep the fur trade afoot. In the Upper Country, 
Cadillac was a man of peace, and, in being so, he embodied the accepted New World 
personality of all French colonists: men and women who embraced Indian customs, 
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traded with Indians and, in a sense, became like Indians. In this framework, the Fox Wars 
are understood and somewhat justified: the French existed in the New World through 
peaceful relations and trade with local Indians, and when an Indian tribe such as the Fox 
threatened that existence, the French had no other choice but to eliminate them. 
However, France‟s New World narrative altered course in Louisiana, and, 
perhaps, that is why less is written about the Natchez Wars. Cadillac, again, personified 
France‟s situational policies, only this time around the Gulf of Mexico. In the Upper 
Country, Cadillac was a man of peace. In Louisiana, he was a warmonger. Just three 
years after leaving Detroit and one year after arriving in Louisiana, Cadillac made his 
fateful voyage up the Mississippi River to inspect silver mines in Illinois. During that 
voyage, he famously “quarreled … with all the nations that are along this river,” and, 
more specifically, refused to exchange gifts and smoke the calumet with the Natchez.
186
 
The relationship between the French and the Natchez never fully mended following 
Cadillac‟s slight. De Bienville, Duclos and other French officials in Louisiana scorned 
Cadillac for his actions on the Mississippi River. “That made a very bad impression,” De 
Bienville wrote to Pontchartrain, noting that several Frenchmen would probably die 
because of Cadillac‟s, supposed, ignorance of Indian customs.
187
 However, in reality, 
Cadillac was far from ignorant of Indian customs, and his actions had a purpose. 
Like the French needed peace to facilitate the fur trade in the Upper Country, they 
needed farmland to facilitate the cash crop market in Louisiana. As it was, some of the 
best farmland in the colony could be found at the Natchez bluffs. It was “the best ground 
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that one could ever see,” Cadillac wrote to Pontchartrain in a 1713 letter.
188
 However, 
Cadillac could not simply destroy the Natchez and take their land. At a time when the 
French and English were desperately vying for Indian allies in the southeast, such an 
audacious and unwarranted attack would not have been popular, and it might have 
spooked such powerful tribes as the Choctaw and the Chickasaw into uniting in an Indian 
uprising against the French, something the outnumbered citizens of Louisiana constantly 
feared.
189
 There was a way to legitimately engage the Natchez, though, and that was by 
vengeance. Indians understood revenge. In fact, according to Duclos, Indians worshipped 
revenge. “It is the custom among the Indians to destroy an entire nation when anyone of 
that nation has killed even one man of another,” Duclos wrote in a letter to Pontchartrain 
in 1716. “ … It will be noticed that Indians are acquainted with no other virtue than 
vengeance … That is their entire religion.”
190
 In that sense, the shrewd Cadillac was still 
observing the customs of the local Indians. Cadillac incited – bated, even – the Natchez 
to murder Frenchmen, and when the Natchez obliged, the French used those murders to 
justify launching a decades-long, tribal-annihilating series of wars against them – all in 
the name of vengeance, the religion of the Indians. 
The Natchez Wars and Fox Wars were similar in that they were long, convoluted 
exterminations of a people. One conflict, however, fit nicely into France‟s accepted New 
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World narrative; the other did not. The French fought the Fox to restore peace to the 
Upper Country and protect the lucrative fur trade, France‟s primary source of revenue in 
North America and that which Claud Michel Begon, the Intendant of Canada from 1712-
1726, referred to as “our principal dependence.”
191
 The Natchez Wars, though, had 
nothing to do with the fur trade and everything to do with land. One would be hard-
pressed to find a straight-forward admission from Cadillac, De Bienville, Perier and the 
like that campaigns mounted against the Natchez were driven by a desire to control their 
fertile lands. They preferred to use words such as “punish” and “protect” when justifying 
conflicts with the Natchez.
192
 However, Philibert Ory, the comptroller of finances in 
Paris, later admitted in a 1730 letter to Perier: 
The affair that occurred at the Natchez may also be attributed to the order that was 
given them by the officer who was in command there to abandon the lands that 
they possessed and to withdraw elsewhere. If it was decided that their proximity 
was prejudicial to our settlements, it was necessary to go about it in quite a 
different manner, and we ought to have understood how to lead them to do what 
was wished of them by gentleness and by methods of conciliation.
193
 
That was easy for Ory to say. He was living comfortably in Paris, overseeing the finances 
of a Louisiana colony that, following the Natchez massacre, was producing tobacco at a 
high rate and selling the tobacco in France for a profitable, fixed rate.
194
 Frenchmen such 
as Antoine de Lamothe Cadillac, however, understood the geopolitical factors occurring 
in the early 1700s that were changing the way France operated in the New World. 
Playing the role of Indian mediator to protect the sacred fur trade had long been a part of 
France‟s New World personality. However, the fur trade did not always dictate French 
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policy. By 1713, France was battling England for outright possession of North America, 
and that meant beating England at its own game: acquiring land, cultivating that land and 
producing a profit from that land. Because of this shift, France practiced situational 
Indian policies during the Fox Wars and the Natchez Wars, and Cadillac, although he is 
portrayed as a pompous villain in many primary and secondary accounts of the era, 
simply embodied those situational policies. In the Upper Country, he strove for peace. In 
Louisiana, he incited war.  
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